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ixSUMMARY
My dissertation research involves three focal questions within the broad topic of
technology innovation with a focus on information security. The questions examined
are:
1. When should an acquirer buy an emerging technology innovation?
2. How do negative innovations diﬀuse through the economic environment?
3. How eﬀective are the reward-based mechanisms in restricting the diﬀusion of
negative innovations through the economic environment?
Chapter 2 addresses the ﬁrst question with an empirical analysis of technology
innovation acquisitions in the telecommunications industry from 1995 to 2001.
Chapter 3 addresses the second question with a cross industry analysis of security
alert data generated by intrusion detection systems during 2006.
Chapter 4 addresses the third question with a large scale empirical analysis of
vulnerabilities disclosed by both reward-based and non-reward-based mechanisms.
xCHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
My dissertation research involves three focal questions within the broad topic of
technology innovation. The questions examined are:
1. When should an acquirer buy an emerging technology innovation?
2. How do negative innovations diﬀuse through the economic environment?
3. How eﬀective are reward-based mechanisms in restricting the diﬀusion of nega-
tive innovations through the economic environment?
Acquisition: In the ﬁrst essay, I examine value created through the external
acquisition of nascent technology innovation. External acquisition of new technology
is a growing trend in the innovation and product development process, particularly in
high technology industries, as ﬁrms complement internal research and development
eﬀorts with aggressive acquisition programs. Yet, despite its importance, there has
been little empirical research on the timing of acquisition decisions in high technology
environments. Building on a real options perspective, I examine the impact of target
age on value created for the buyer. Applying an event study methodology to tech-
nology acquisitions in the telecommunications industry from 1995 to 2001, empirical
evidence supports acquiring early in the face of uncertainty. Furthermore, both target
intellectual property and the target’s public/private status moderate the impact of
target age on value created for the buyer. In summary, the equity markets reward the
acquisition of younger companies and penalize the acquisition of older targets that
do not own patents or are publicly traded.
1Diﬀusion: In sharp contrast to the ﬁrst essay, the second essay examines the
diﬀusion of negative innovations. While destruction can be creative (Schumpeter,
1934), certainly not all destruction is creative. Some is just destruction. Rogers (2003,
p. 106) claims that “one of the most serious shortcomings of diﬀusion research is its
pro-innovation bias”. While in the previous essay, innovation is considered beneﬁcial;
this essay focuses on negative innovation. Speciﬁcally, I examine two fundamentally
diﬀerent paths to information security compromise— an opportunistic path and a
deliberate path. Through a grounded approach using interviews, observations, and
secondary data, I advance a model of the information security compromise process
from the perspective of the attacked organization. Using one year of alert data from
intrusion detection devices, empirical analysis provides evidence that these paths
follow two distinct, but interrelated diﬀusion patterns. Although distinct, I ﬁnd
empirical evidence that these paths both converge and escalate. Beyond the speciﬁc
ﬁndings in the Internet security context, the study leads to a richer understanding of
the diﬀusion of negative technological innovation.
Reward-based Mechanisms: In the third essay, I build on the second essay by
examining the eﬀectiveness of reward-based mechanisms in restricting the diﬀusion
of negative innovations. There are has been considerable general debate about the
disclosure of vulnerabilities and recent speciﬁc debate about the creation of market-
type mechanisms to reward benign disclosure. In particular, concerns have been raised
that vulnerability markets introduce the opportunity for information leakage which
decreases social welfare (Kannan and Telang, 2005). Using two years of alert data for
vulnerabilities disclosed through reward-based and non-reward-based mechanisms, I
ﬁnd evidence of vulnerability market eﬀectiveness despite any leakage which may be
occurring. While disclosures through reward-based mechanisms are just as likely to
be exploited as non-reward-based disclosures, exploits from reward-based disclosures
are less likely to occur in the ﬁrst week after disclosure. Further the overall volume
2of alerts is reduced. This research helps determine the eﬀectiveness of reward-based
mechanisms and provides guidance for security policy makers.
3CHAPTER II
TARGET AGE AND THE ACQUISITION OF
INNOVATION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
2.1 Introduction
The importance of new product development is highlighted through a vast literature
on the topic in operations management (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001; Terwiesch et al.,
1998), marketing (Hauser et al., 2006; Wind and Mahajan, 1997), strategy (MacMil-
lan and McGrath, 2002; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004) and organizational behavior
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Typical issues examined in this literature include
concept development and product deﬁnition (Ulrich and Ellison, 1999), supply chain
design (Lee and Tang, 1997), organizational practices (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995),
development process management (Bhuiyan et al., 2004; Terwiesch and Loch, 1999),
and intellectual property (Ziedonis, 2004). Recent surveys appear in Shane and Ul-
rich (2004) and Krishnan and Ulrich (2001). Barring a few exceptions (Ahuja and
Katila, 2001; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Lambe and Spekman, 1997), the primary
focus of this research stream has been on the product development and innovation
process internal to the ﬁrm.
In high technology industries, external acquisition of new technology plays a vi-
tal role in the product development process (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Since
time-to-market pressures often render internal development too slow (Lambe and
Spekman, 1997), ﬁrms like Microsoft and Cisco augment internal research and devel-
opment (R&D) with aggressive acquisition programs that are becoming increasingly
4important as a way for “maturing strategic buyers to access new growth opportu-
nities” and to place “bets on new ideas or technologies” (Anonymous, 2006). Ac-
quisitions also add a key exploratory component to product development, allowing
access to technologies that ﬁll gaps or correct blind spots (Chesbrough, 2003). Fur-
ther, technology acquisitions foster a strong market for ideas, providing incentives for
entrepreneurs to sweat, to risk and, maybe, to exit wealthy (Gans and Stern, 2003).
However, despite its importance, technology acquisitions have received limited atten-
tion in the product development literature, and value creation through acquisitions
is not well understood in high technology environments where acquisitions foster in-
novation rather than conglomerate diversiﬁcation (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999).
In this paper, we focus on the eﬀect of a fundamental characteristic of a target,
speciﬁcally target age, on value creation for the buyer in high technology environ-
ments. Target age is an objective, observable (even for small, private startups) and
critical diﬀerentiator that has received considerable media and industry attention,
but limited research consideration. From the perspective of the buyer, the emergence
of an early stage company begins an inherent conﬂict between risk and safety. Should
organizations wait until more information is available about the target, its technology,
its product, and the market so that a better valuation can be obtained? Or should the
target be acquired early to preempt others and gain early access to key technologies?
Even conventional proverbs oﬀer conﬂicting advice as managers may choose to “look
before they leap” or alternatively they may believe that “he who hesitates is lost”.
This ambiguity is also reﬂected in the trade literature, where target age is a frequent
focal point (Anonymous, 2006; Wysocki, 1999). Diametrically opposed opinions are
espoused such as emphasizing that “the important thing is, the bets are being placed
on younger companies” (Wysocki, 1999), while others ﬁnd lessons in the diﬃculties
that acquirers like Cisco and Lucent have had with acquiring early stage companies
(Schiesel, 2000). Clearly the role of target age in value creation is unclear.
5Recent acquisition research has focused on some related aspects of timing, al-
though not speciﬁcally on the eﬀect of target age on value creation for the buyer.
In a study of acquisitions in the context of industry waves, positive eﬀects on ac-
quirer value are seen from acquisitions that are made towards the beginning of an
acquisition wave (Carow et al., 2004). In a study on the eﬀects of structural integra-
tion on innovation outcomes, Puranam et al. (2006) ﬁnd that increased target age
decreases the hazard rate of acquirer new product introductions. When accounting
based performance measures are used, increasing target age increases the beneﬁts
from an acquisition (Chaudhuri et al., 2005). In a study of the telecommunications
industry, Warner et al. (2006) ﬁnd that acquisitions are more likely to occur before
the establishment of a formal standard when the target ﬁrm has standards relevant
intellectual property.
The product development literature highlights a similar dilemma between the use
of proven technologies and unproven (but promising) technologies in developing new
products (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999; Iansiti, 1995). An-
alytical models demonstrate that selecting only proven technologies for inclusion in
product design, may not be optimal in dynamic environments (Krishnan and Bhat-
tacharya, 2002; Loch and Terwiesch, 2005). Likewise, forcing early ﬁnalization of
speciﬁcations may result in a ﬁrm getting locked into an incorrect position (Bhat-
tacharya et al., 1998). The fundamental insight from the analytical models is that
ﬂexibility is valuable in dynamic environments because it aﬀords managers the abil-
ity to change course as better market and customer information become available.
However, ﬂexibility comes at a cost, since ﬁrms may have to invest in parallel tech-
nologies, over-design the product to work with alternative technologies, and monitor
the product development process closely to terminate ineﬀective paths (Bhattacharya
et al., 1998).
In this research, we examine acquisitions made by equipment manufacturers within
6the telecommunications industry during 1995-2001 because of the industry’s emerging
standards, deregulation, numerous innovations, acquisition volume, and uncertainty
during that period (Warner et al., 2006). These features indicate that the telecom-
munications industry ﬁt the deﬁnition of high velocity during this period since there
was “rapid and discontinuous change in demand, competitors, technology and/or
regulation, such that information [was] often inaccurate, unavailable, or obsolete”
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 816). Evaluation of acquisition opportunities
is particularly diﬃcult in these environments since it is not clear which technologies
will dominate or how the markets will evolve. We develop our hypotheses through a
real options perspective that is particularly relevant to the valuation of opportunities
in the high velocity environment of the telecommunications industry. A real options
framework adds a fresh perspective on technology acquisitions with considerable ex-
planatory power in uncertain environments (McGrath, 1997).
We use standard event study methods (Brown and Warner, 1985) to measure value
creation through acquisitions by examining the abnormal stock market reaction to
acquisition announcements by equipment manufacturers in the telecommunications
industry. The use of event study methods has three advantages in our context. First,
the event study method eﬀectively isolates the impact of the acquisition on the ac-
quiring ﬁrm better than aggregate measures based on annually reported accounting
data (MacKinlay, 1997), particularly when ﬁrms make several acquisitions within the
same year (Fuller et al., 2002). Second, for acquisitions of early stage targets, im-
mediate impact on accounting indicators may be insigniﬁcant or even negative and
will depend more on the stage of development of the innovation rather than its fu-
ture value. Further, intangible values inherent in technology acquisitions (such as
intellectual property and knowledge assets) are diﬃcult to value through traditional
productivity metrics, while equity prices include a capitalization of all future beneﬁts.
Third, event studies are well established in the literature as a method for assessing
7value created through acquisitions. Utilizing a metric that has been frequently used
in the literature enables us to exploit previous ﬁndings in our model.
There are two primary contributions of this research. First, theoretical under-
pinnings of previous empirical research on value creation through acquisitions have
focused on the ﬁnancial drivers of acquisitions, such as economies of scale and cost
savings (Lambrecht, 2004), managerial mis-incentives (Moeller, 2004), equity mis-
valuations (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), and free cash ﬂow (Jensen, 1986). While
these variables have considerable explanatory power in the traditional environments
analyzed, they do not capture the primary drivers of acquisitions in the high tech-
nology industries, such as time-to-market pressures, capability enhancement in new
technologies, and exploratory resource conﬁgurations (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999;
Iansiti, 1995). The real options framework and empirical analysis in this paper pro-
vides a fresh perspective and a new set of value drivers in the technology acquisition
context. Second, we empirically investigate the impact of an observable and objec-
tive characteristic of the target (speciﬁcally target age) that has been the source of
considerable debate in the trade literature, but has received scant attention in the
academic literature. Further, we identify and evaluate conditions that moderate the
impact of this critical diﬀerentiator on value creation for the acquirer.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop
our hypotheses on the impact of target age on value creation for the buyer. Then, we
detail the data and methodology used to test the hypotheses. Next, we discuss the
results of the analysis. Finally, we summarize the ﬁndings of the research and outline
future research directions.
82.2 Theory and Hypotheses Development
2.2.1 The Real Options Perspective
Two fundamental and counter-intuitive principles underlie the real options perspec-
tive on the valuation of technology investments that make it suitable for the context
examined here. First, it is uncertainty that drives the value of real options (McGrath,
1997), since options are characterized by a limit on the potential loss (the cost of the
option) with a variable, but potentially large return. This is similar to the acquisition
of technology, where the loss is limited to the cost of the acquisition, but the potential
beneﬁts are large if the right environmental conditions develop. Second, the initial
investment in an option gives a ﬁrm the ability to select subsequent actions only if
their outcomes are favorable. This possibility of abandonment is a key feature of the
real options approach (Adner and Levinthal, 2004), and is also characteristic of a
technology acquisition where subsequent investments to develop the technology and
market are made only if proﬁtable. Explicit recognition and valuation of this ﬂexibil-
ity is a key feature of the real options approach. Consequently, many authors have
prescribed the real options perspective as an alternative approach for the valuation of
investments in uncertain environments (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Michel, 2007;
Fichman et al., 2005; Luehrman, 1998).
2.2.2 Acquisitions through a Real Options Perspective
Two key points underlie our application of the real options perspective in the context
of technology acquisitions in a high velocity industry. First, we view the target as a
combination of mature operations and growth options that have yet to be explored.
Targets vary in the level of growth options that are present. The price of the target
reﬂects the value of its existing operations and the value of its growth options that
it is likely to exploit on its own, since a rational target will not accept a price that
is lower. In this sense, the acquisition can be viewed not as the strike of an option,
9but instead as the initial purchase of an option. In summary, the addition of the real
options perspective helps to decompose an acquisition into two parts—an acquisition
in the market for products and an acquisition in the market for ideas. In the former,
the acquisition focuses on existing operations; in the latter, the focus is on future
growth options.
Second, in the real options perspective on acquisitions, the synergistic value comes
from the growth options that the acquirer can better exploit than the target can on
its own. Value creation from the acquisition is dependent on the magnitude of this
synergistic value. A key point is that if the target could fully exploit its innovation
on its own, then this would be reﬂected in the price paid for the target. Value is
created when the combination of acquirer and target resources allow possibilities that
neither could realize alone (Capron and Pistre, 2002). Acquirers are typically larger
than targets — in our data set, we found acquirers to be an average of two orders
of magnitude larger than their targets (the average ratio of acquirer assets to price
paid for the target was 117 to 1). Consequently, acquirers have more complementary
assets than their targets, such as access to capital, established distribution networks,
or manufacturing operations necessary for the innovation of a target to be useful
(Tripsas, 1997).
2.2.3 Target Age through a Real Options Perspective
Table 1 summarizes the impact of target age on several sources of value creation
(organized along two dimensions) in the technology acquisition context, when viewed
through a real options perspective. First, younger targets have fewer mature oper-
ations and more growth options than older targets. By acquiring a target early at
lower costs, more technology acquisitions can be done within a given budget, and
the acquirer is then able to build a portfolio of growth options (Girotra et al., 2006),
enabling ﬂexibility. Rather than acting merely as a substitute for internal innovation,
10the creation of a portfolio of technologies allows an acquirer to evolve its product port-
folio opportunistically and to experiment (Rindova and Kotha, 2001). In uncertain
environments, this ﬂexibility is valuable in multiple ways. It allows the ﬁrm to de-
fer technology choices to a time when more information is available about customer
preferences (Bhattacharya et al., 1998), enables a ﬁrm to pursue alternative prod-
uct development paths (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002), achieve time-to-market
objectives without sacriﬁcing product quality (Cohen et al., 1996), and avoid the
negative eﬀects of being late to market (Hendricks and Singhal, 1997).
Second, target ﬁrms vary in the level of uncertainty inherent in its technology and
market. It is exactly the substantial market and technological uncertainty associated
with the growth options in a younger target that drives value from a real options
perspective, since “the greater the variance in net revenues that might be accessed
by commercializing the technology, the greater the option value” (McGrath, 1997,
p. 979). In the acquisition context, downside losses are limited to the price paid
for the target. On the margin, younger companies cost less and this serves to limit
potential downside losses. At the same time, younger companies often possess newer
technology whose upside potential is high, particularly in winner-take-all industries.
The idiosyncratic risk associated with a young target reduces its valuation and price,
but when part of a portfolio of options for the acquirer, this idiosyncratic risk is
reduced through diversiﬁcation (Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003). As a target gets
older, its inherent uncertainty is reduced, lowering its option value, and increasing
the price paid for the target.
Finally, older targets have also had time to develop more infrastructure and take
advantage of growth options on their own. Therefore, they beneﬁt less from the
complementary assets (Tripsas, 1997), commercialization expertise, or managerial
experience (King and Tucci, 2002) in the acquiring ﬁrm. The increased ability to
function independently shows, on the margin, that there is less potential for synergy
11and value creation. Further, integration diﬃculties increase as targets grow older,
creating pressure to retain their original identity and staﬀ (Ranft and Lord, 2002),
and reducing synergistic value. Thus, we empirically test the preceding reasoning
through the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 In high velocity environments, value creation for the buyer will be
negatively associated with target age.
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132.2.4 The Moderating Role of Target Intellectual Property
A key diﬀerence in some target companies lie in the intellectual property (IP) they
possess, protected through patents. While the value of the patent can be incorporated
in the price paid for the target, we argue in Table 1 that patents mitigate the negative
eﬀects of increased target age. The table focuses on this moderating role of target
patents, rather than their direct impact on value creation. The table identiﬁes two
mechanisms through which patents reduce the negative eﬀects of increased target age.
First, patents signal the presence of research and development activity in the tar-
get (Griliches, 1990). These activities produce on-going innovation, reducing concerns
about aging and a lack of innovation (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000), and creates un-
explored growth options that make an older target more akin to a young company.
Even for older targets, patented technologies beneﬁt from the commercialization ex-
pertise of a larger acquirer and subsequent “amplifying” investments that increase
the value of the technology (McGrath, 1997), such as lobbying to enact favorable
legislation, participating in industry organizations to promote compatible standards,
and exploiting existing customer relationships to generate demand (McGrath, 1997).
Thus, patents indicate growth options even in an older target, and reduce the negative
impact of target age.
Second, patents provide protection from imitation and disclose information about
the target’s technology (Hall et al., 2005). Patents are awarded after a review of
originality and uniqueness by the patent oﬃce and this independent review partially
reduces the uncertainty associated with the technology of a young target. Patents also
raise visibility of young targets among potential bidders. This increases its valuation
and its price (Austin, 1993), and consequently reduces the beneﬁts of early acquisition.
In summary, patents mute the negative eﬀect of target age for older targets and
information disclosure reduces the beneﬁts of early acquisition. Therefore, we further
hypothesize that:
14Hypothesis 2 In high velocity environments, the presence of intellectual property in
the target mitigates the negative eﬀect of the target age on value created for the buyer.
2.2.5 Acquiring Private Targets
Another key observable diﬀerence is that some targets are public while others remain
private at the time of acquisition. Prior research has found signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two sub-groups and have documented a direct positive eﬀect of target
private status on acquirer value (Capron and Shen, 2007; Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller
et al., 2002; Oﬃcer, 2007). Along lines of reasoning that are similar to that of Hy-
pothesis 2, we argue that a target’s private status mutes the negative impact of target
age on value creation for the acquirer. As before, we focus on this moderating role of
target private status, rather than its direct impact on value creation.
Consider an older target that is privately held. Due to its limited access to the
capital markets, in spite of its age, its unexplored growth options can beneﬁt from the
superior resources of a public acquirer in multiple ways. The prominence and greater
resources of the public acquirer will enable it to make eﬀective amplifying investments
(McGrath, 1997) that increase the value of the unexplored growth options. Commer-
cialization of growth options require access to resources for manufacturing, marketing
and distribution that can beneﬁt from access to the capital markets. Thus, private
status of the target retains the synergy gains from acquisition, even for older private
targets. Conversely, public status provides access to resources, enabling even pub-
lic young targets to develop infrastructure, reducing synergy from early acquisitions.
Therefore, we test the preceding logic through the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 In high velocity environments, privately held status of the target mit-
igates the negative eﬀect of the target age on value created for the buyer.
152.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Data Sources
To build our data set, we searched the Wall Street Journal, Business Wire, PR
Newswire and Dow Jones News Service to identify 361 acquisition announcements
by publicly traded buyers in the telecommunications industry from 1995 to 2001.
Of these 361 announcements, 249 announcements were by equipment manufacturers
(such as Cisco, Nortel and Lucent), while 112 were acquisition announcements by ser-
vice providers (such as Verizon, Cingular and MCI). Equipment manufacturers made
acquisitions to obtain new products and technology, while a majority of the acquisi-
tions by service providers related to the acquisition of new customers, new geographic
coverage areas, new licenses and consolidation for economies of scale. To focus on the
acquisition of products and technology in a high velocity industry, we concentrated
on the 249 technology acquisition announcements by equipment manufacturers. The
dataset was further augmented with information from the Securities Data Company
(SDC) Mergers & Acquisitions database. First, we checked for any acquisitions by
equipment manufacturers in the SDC database during this time period to ensure
that no relevant acquisitions were missed from the search for announcements. Addi-
tionally, though announced, some acquisitions were later withdrawn. After removing
withdrawn acquisitions, and those for which insuﬃcient market trading data was
available, 238 acquisitions remained.
Because of the importance of the exact date that the market learns of the acqui-
sition (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), we searched all publications included in the
Factiva database for a one year period preceding the announcement date, to check for
leakage of information regarding the acquisition. We adjusted the announcement date
to the earliest date when the acquisition was announced or reported in the media.
When the announcement was made after 4 p. m. or on a day the equity market was
closed, we adjusted the announcement date to the next trading date.
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172.3.1.1 Determining the age of the target
Unfortunately, the age of the target at the time of acquisition was not readily avail-
able through public data sources. To determine the company inception date, several
sources were consulted. First, in some cases, the press release about the acquisition
noted the start date of the target company. Also, news articles proﬁling the company
or company founders sometimes noted the start date. By searching through news
archives and company ﬁlings, start dates were obtained for 185 of the 238 companies
in our sample. In 47 cases, both the month and year were available; in the remaining
138 cases, only the year was available and the beginning of the year was used to
determine target age. The age of the target at the time of acquisition ranged from 2
months to 61 years with a mean of 8.4 years.
2.3.1.2 Calculating Abnormal Returns
We use the event study methodology to estimate the change in stock price (the
abnormal return) for the acquirer attributable to the acquisition announcement by
adjusting the stock price changes for market-wide movements (Brown and Warner,
1985). Abnormal returns are calculated using both the Market Model as well as the
Market Adjusted Return model.
The Market Model posits a linear relationship between the return on a stock and
the return on the market portfolio over a given time period. This relationship is
expressed as: ri,t = αi + βirm,t + εi,t, where ri,t is the return of stock i on day t; rm,t
is the return of the market portfolio on day t; αi is the intercept of the relationship
for stock i; βi is the slope of the relationship for stock i; and εi,t is the error term
for stock i on day t. The term βirm,t is the return to stock i on day t that can be
attributed to market wide movements, while εi,t is the unexplained part of the return
that captures the eﬀect of ﬁrm speciﬁc events on day t. For each ﬁrm, we estimate
ˆ αi and ˆ βi using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression over an estimation period
18of 200 trading days ending 10 days prior to the acquisition announcement, with the
equally weighted Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index as a proxy for
the market portfolio. A minimum of 40 return observations in the estimation period
is required for the estimation procedure. The abnormal return (Ai,t) for stock i on
day t is: Ai,t = ri,t − ˆ αi − ˆ βirm,t, where ri,t is the actual return on stock i on day t.
In the absence of any abnormal return, the return for the stock can be predicted by
the Market Model parameters and any excess return (error term) can be attributed
to ﬁrm speciﬁc events on that day.
Our primary results and discussion are based on the Market Adjusted Return
model as recommended when frequent acquisitions overlap the estimation period used
in the Market Model, reducing conﬁdence in the Market Model estimated parameters
(Fuller et al., 2002). In the Market Adjusted Return model, the abnormal return
(Ai,t) for stock i on day t is calculated as Ai,t = ri,t − rm,t. The rationale is that in
the absence of any abnormal return, the return for the stock can be predicted by the
market return. For short-window event studies, any gain in estimation from including
the Market Model parameters may be lost by overlap of other acquisitions during the
model parameter estimation period (Fuller et al., 2002). Therefore, we focus on the
Market Adjusted Returns in our analysis; the Market Model results are included
to demonstrate the robustness of the results. To summarize the average valuation
impact of acquisition announcements on the market value of ﬁrms in our sample, we
focus on the abnormal returns (Ai,0) on the event day (t = 0). The use of a one day
window allows us to isolate the eﬀects of the acquisition announcement (McWilliams
and Siegel, 1997). Consistent with other research, we use the abnormal returns (Ai,0)
as the dependent variable in the regressions (Asquith et al., 1983; Chang, 1998).
192.3.2 Control Variables
Due to the vast literature on acquisitions, it is critical to control for known eﬀects
on the abnormal returns associated with acquisitions, to isolate the impact of target
age. Four types of control variables were used in the following regressions— buyer
characteristics, target characteristics, acquisition characteristics, and environmental
characteristics. All monetary values are converted to the January 1995 equivalent
using the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer price
index.
2.3.2.1 Buyer Characteristics
For buyer characteristics, we incorporated the total market value of the buyer im-
mediately prior to the announcement because ﬁrm size has been found to inﬂuence
acquirer valuation (Moeller et al., 2004) and because abnormal returns are expressed
as percentages of market value. The buyer market value ranges from 104 million
US$ to 430 billion US$ with a mean of 92 billion US$. The buyer free cash intensity
(deﬁned as the net income for the prior year minus income taxes minus preferred
and common dividends divided by revenue) is included to control for excess free cash
leading to low-beneﬁt acquisitions (Jensen, 1986) and ranges from -1.25 to 0.44 with a
mean of 0.14. The buyer R&D intensity (deﬁned as the expenditure for the prior year
on R&D divided by revenue) is included to control for absorptive capacity (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990) and ranges from 0.01 to 0.84 with a mean of 0.15. The buyer
leverage (deﬁned as the prior year debt divided by assets) is included to account for
possible improvements in managerial decision making due to high leverage and sub-
sequent oversight by the debt providers (Jensen, 1986). Buyer leverage ranges from
0.03 to 0.70 with a mean of 0.28. Further, we include the number of prior acquisitions
that a ﬁrm has done at the time of the announcement to control for learning from
prior experiences (Hayward, 2002). This data is calculated from the SDC database
20of mergers and acquisitions. Finally, we include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects for seven acquirers
with ﬁve or more acquisitions, to control for unobserved heterogeneity from a small
number of frequent acquirers that could aﬀect the results (the results are robust to
including, excluding or changing the threshold of this frequent acquirer set).
2.3.2.2 Target Characteristics
Next, because private ﬁrms were 67% of our sample, we were limited to data available
for private ﬁrms. For target characteristics, we use the total number of employees at
the target at the time of the acquisition to control for the target ﬁrm size. Because
our independent variable is target age, it is important to distinguish between speciﬁc
age related eﬀects and those due to target size (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Target
employees range from 17 to 7800 with a mean of 533. To determine the number of
employees, we combined information from SDC, press releases about the acquisition,
news articles about the target, and required ﬁlings. Because of the diﬃculty in accu-
rately determining the number of employees, 28 acquisitions were excluded; however,
excluded acquisitions range across all ages and acquisition values. The public/private
status (deﬁned as 1 if the target was private, 0 if public) is included to control for
previously documented public versus private eﬀects (Fuller et al., 2002; Oﬃcer, 2007,
e.g.).
2.3.2.3 Target Patents and Patent Citations
To determine if the target company held any patents, we consulted data directly
available from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce and created a dataset of 2,264
individual patents for the target ﬁrms including ﬁling date and grant date as well
as a detailed list of the patents which cited patents within the dataset. Based on
this data, we incorporated a target patent indicator variable that was set to 1 if the
target held one or more patents at the time of acquisition and 0 otherwise (Puranam
et al., 2006). Only 52% of the targets in our sample had ﬁled for a patent at the time
21of acquisition. This dichotomous indicator variable provides a good abstraction and
representation of the knowledge available to the market at the time of acquisition
(Puranam et al., 2006).
In addition to the patent indicator variable, we also incorporated a measure of
patent quality deﬁned in Hall et al. (2005) that calculates the citation weighted total
number of patents of the target depreciated to the time of the acquisition (patent
stock). The detailed procedure to calculate the patent stock variable can be found
in Hall et al. (2005) . Thus, this measure calculates the value of a patent based on
the number of citations it received in subsequent years and how recent the patent
is. Hall et al. (2005) demonstrate that this citation weighted measure is a better
indicator of the value of the patent portfolio than other measures. However, this
measure has a signiﬁcant limitation in our sample because the citations of later patents
are signiﬁcantly truncated. We use a procedure outlined in Hall et al. (2005) to
extrapolate the citation weighted count of the patents to a consistent 30 year lag
period from the date of issuance. We include the depreciated patent stock to control
for heterogeneity in patent quality. We also test the regressions after excluding the
patent stock variable and ﬁnd no diﬀerence in our main results.
2.3.2.4 Acquisition Characteristics
Next, we include characteristics of the acquisition as control variables in the model.
The total value of the acquisition is included to control for the size of the transaction.
The transaction values, as reported by the SDC database, range from 3.1 million
US$ to 36 billion US$ with a mean of 1.25 billion US$. Further, the weight of the
acquisition (deﬁned as the ratio of acquisition value to the buyer market value) is
included to control for the impact of the acquisition on the buyer because of the
size diﬀerence between the buyer and the target (Moeller et al., 2004). A large
size diﬀerence can impact bargaining and allow the buyer to extract more of the
22total acquisition value from the target. Acquisition weights range from 0.001% to
220% with a mean of 11.7%. The source of funds for the acquisition (cash versus
stock) as reported in the SDC database is included to control for the method of
payment (Andrade et al., 2001). A few acquisitions were not completely cash or
stock. When the payment form was mixed, we coded it based on the largest source
of funds used to complete the transaction. Because of the importance of acquirer
knowledge about the target assets (Coﬀ, 1999), we also include an indicator variable if
a signiﬁcant prior relationship existed between the acquirer and target. To determine
the existence of a prior relationship, we read all press releases prior to the acquisition
announcement available through Factiva that mentioned both the acquirer and the
target, and found evidence of signiﬁcant prior relationships (such as joint product
development, or equity investment) in 23% of the cases.
2.3.2.5 Environmental Characteristics
Finally, we include characteristics of the economic environment. We include the
Standard & Poor’s 500 Index on the day of the acquisition announcement to control
for high market valuations on the day of the announcement. Further, we include a
post-bubble indicator variable if the acquisition occurred after the technology “bubble”
using March 2000 as the cutoﬀ date (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; Uhlenbruck
et al., 2006). Further, prior research indicates the presence of acquisition waves in
many industries and highlights certain advantages for acquisitions that are made in
the early phases of an industry acquisition wave (Carow et al., 2004). Following
the procedure in Carow et al. (2004), we identify pre-1996 as the early part of the
acquisition wave in the telecommunications industry, and we include an indicator
variable (early mover) if the acquisition occurred prior to 1996, to ensure the results
found are due to target age and not early mover advantages in an acquisition wave
(Carow et al., 2004).
232.3.3 Regression Model
Based on data availability for the independent and control variables, a sample of 141
acquisitions remain for the regression models. Our empirical analysis is based on the
following equation:
AR = β0 + β1 ∗ M + β2 ∗ F + β3 ∗ I + β4 ∗ L
+β5 ∗ J + β6 ∗ E + β7 ∗ V + β8 ∗ P + β9 ∗ K
+β10 ∗ W + β11 ∗ D + β12 ∗ S + β13 ∗ R + β14 ∗ B
+β15 ∗ Y + β16 ∗ N + β17 ∗ A + β18 ∗ A ∗ P
+β19 ∗ A ∗ V + ε
where AR is the day 0 (Ai,0) abnormal market reaction (%); M is the buyer market
value (US$); F is the buyer free cash intensity; I is the buyer R&D intensity; L is
the buyer leverage; J is the buyer prior acquisition experience; E is the natural log
of the number of target employees; V is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the
target is private; P is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the target company
had patents; K is the natural log of the patent stock (depreciated, citation weighted
sum of patents); W is the acquisition weight (acquisition value divided by the buyer
market value); D is the total value of the deal (US$); S is an indicator variable
that is set to 1 if the transaction was primarily paid through stock and 0 otherwise;
R is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the dyad had a prior relationship and
0 otherwise; B is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the acquisition occurred
after March 2000 and 0 otherwise; Y is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if the
acquisition occurred during the early mover phase (pre 1996) of the acquisition wave
in the telecommunications industry, and 0 otherwise; N is the S&P 500 Index value
on the date of the acquisition; A is the natural log of the target age (to evaluate
Hypothesis 2); A ∗ P is the interaction of target age and target patents (to evaluate
Hypothesis 2); A∗V is the interaction of target age and private/public status variable
24(to evaluate Hypothesis 3); and ε is unexplained error.
Summarized descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables are shown
in Table 2. We also mean centered the continuous variables in the model (total
acquisition value D, patent stock K and target age A) to reduce multi-collinearity
eﬀects when interaction terms are present (Aiken and West, 1991).
2.4 Results and Discussion
2.4.1 Abnormal Returns
Table 3 shows the both the Market Model and Market Adjusted abnormal returns
in the whole sample of 141 ﬁrms and speciﬁc sub-samples. The results presented
in Panel A for the whole sample are consistent with earlier results in the literature
and exhibit a strong negative abnormal return from acquisition announcements. The
mean abnormal return is -1.01 % for day 0 and the t-statistics and Wilcoxon signed
rank test statistic are signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the other panels show that the day
0 negative abnormal return in the whole sample are muted for younger companies,
providing preliminary support for Hypotheses 1, that we further investigate through
the regression analysis reported below.
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262.4.2 Cross Sectional Regression Analysis
To test the three hypotheses, ﬁve hierarchical regression models were analyzed based
on Equation 1. The results are shown in Table 4 for the Market Adjusted Return
and Table 5 for the Market Model returns; both sets of regressions use the single day
(day 0) abnormal return as the dependent variable. The results are similar in both
models; because of the presence of acquirers with multiple acquisitions overlapping
the estimation period, we focus on the results based on the Market Adjusted Returns
in Table 4, as explained in Fuller et al. (2002).
In the ﬁrst model (Model 1), only the control variables were entered. In Model
1 only the patent presence (β8 = 0.045, t = 2.30) and patent stock (β9 = −0.008,
t = −1.74) are signiﬁcant. In the second model, the age of the target (using a
natural log transformation) was entered in the regression model. Consistent with a
diminishing marginal eﬀect of target age (Hypothesis 1), the natural log of target age
(β17 = −0.012, t = −1.69) is signiﬁcant. Patent presence and patent stock remain
signiﬁcant with approximately the same coeﬃcients as in Model 1.
In the third model, we investigate the moderating eﬀect of the existence of target
patents on the relationship between buyer abnormal returns and target age. In Model
3, the interaction of age and patent presence is signiﬁcant (β18 = 0.032, t = 2.54)
and supports Hypothesis 2. Patent presence and patent stock remain signiﬁcant with
approximately the same coeﬃcients as in prior models. In Model 4, the interaction
of age and private status is not signiﬁcant (β19 = 0.020, t = 1.54; however, in the
full model (Model 5) of Equation 1, the parameter estimates for age (β17 = −0.046,
t = −3.64), for the interaction of age and patent presence (β18 = 0.037, t = 2.92) and
for the interaction of age and private status (β19 = 0.027, t = 2.10) are signiﬁcant. In
all models, the variance inﬂation factor values remain well below the cut-oﬀ value of
10, suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a signiﬁcant problem in the data (Neter
et al., 1990). The Market Model (in Table 5) exhibits results that are similar to those
27Figure 1: Marginal Impact of Target Age on Abnormal Reaction
in Table 4.
The results support Hypothesis 1. In all models that include the natural log of the
target age, we ﬁnd support for early acquisition of new technology. Figure 1 plots the
abnormal returns in the sample as a function of target age based on the parameter
estimates in Table 4. The ﬁgure illustrates the positive reaction to the acquisition of
young ﬁrms, with rapid loss of value for the buyer as the target ages.
The results in Table 4 also support Hypothesis 2. The coeﬃcient for the patent
interaction term is signiﬁcant in Model 3 for both the Market Model and the Market
Adjusted Returns. Overall, we ﬁnd that the presence of target patents mutes the
negative impact of target age on value created for the buyer. To further analyze
the relationships between target age, patents and value creation for the acquirer,
we separated the data points into two groups based on the patent presence variable
28Table 4: Hierarchical Regression for Day 0 Abnormal Market Adjusted Returns
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
β0: Intercept -0.040
(-0.74)
-0.052
(-0.96)
-0.042
(-0.80)
-0.016
(-0.28)
0.007
(0.12)
β1: Buyer Market Value
(billion US$)
0.015
(0.16)
0.020
(0.23)
0.011
(0.13)
0.002
(0.02)
-0.014
(-0.17)
β2: Buyer Free Cash Intensity
(Free Cash/Sales)
-0.014
(-0.42)
-0.020
(-0.58)
-0.036
(-1.08)
-0.021
(-0.63)
-0.041
(-1.23)
β3: Buyer R&D Intensity
(R&D/Sales)
0.026
(0.34)
0.026
(0.35)
0.002
(0.03)
0.043
(0.57)
0.021
(0.29)
β4: Buyer Leverage
(Debt / Assets)
0.088
(1.55)
0.087
(1.54)
0.090
(1.63)
0.076
(1.34)
0.075
(1.37)
β5: Buyer Acquisition Experience
(prior acquisitions x 10−3)
-0.282
(-0.70)
-0.405
(-1.00)
-0.557
(-1.39)
-0.253
(-0.61)
-0.375
(-0.93)
β6: Log of Target Employees -0.001
(-0.18)
0.004
(0.57)
0.002
(0.34)
0.004
(0.54)
0.002
(0.26)
β7: Target Private
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.009
(0.63)
0.009
(0.58)
0.012
(0.84)
0.003
(0.20)
0.005
(0.37)
β8: Target Patent Presence
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.045∗∗
(2.30)
0.050∗∗
(2.56)
0.057∗∗∗
(2.93)
0.043∗∗
(2.13)
0.048∗∗
(2.44)
β9: Target Patent Stock
(log depreciated cites)
-0.008∗
(-1.74)
-0.008∗
(-1.76)
-0.008∗
(-1.90)
-0.006
(-1.41)
-0.006
(-1.47)
β10: Acquisition Weight x 103
(Acq. Val. / Buyer Val.)
-0.022
(-1.00)
-0.025
(-1.13)
-0.031
(-1.44)
-0.021
(-0.95)
-0.027
(-1.24)
β11: Acquisition Value
(billion US$)
-0.002
(-0.91)
-0.002
(-1.07)
-0.002
(-0.88)
-0.002
(-1.17)
-0.002
(-1.00)
β12: Payment Method
(1 if stock, 0 if cash)
0.003
(0.20)
-0.001
(0.01)
-0.003
(-0.25)
-0.002
(-0.12)
-0.006
(-0.47)
β13: Prior Relationship
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.006
(-0.44)
-0.002
(-0.13)
-0.004
(-0.29)
-0.003
(-0.25)
-0.006
(-0.48)
β14: Post Bubble (March 2000)
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.017
(1.34)
0.019
(1.53)
0.022∗
(1.74)
0.018
(1.43)
0.020
(1.64)
β15: Early Mover
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.002
(-0.08)
0.003
(0.12)
0.013
(0.46)
0.004
(0.13)
0.014
(0.53)
β16: S&P 500 Index
(/1000)
-10.985
(-0.33)
-5.210
(-0.16)
13.546
(0.41)
-10.867
(-0.33)
8.801
(0.27)
Fixed Eﬀects
(for frequent acquirers)
yes yes yes yes yes
β17: Log of Target Age
(years)
-0.012∗
(-1.69)
-0.028∗∗∗
(-2.98)
-0.024∗∗
(-2.29)
-0.046∗∗∗
(-3.64)
β18: Patent*log Target Age 0.032∗∗
(2.54)
0.037∗∗∗
(2.92)
β19: Private*log Target Age 0.020
(1.54)
0.027∗∗
(2.10)
R2 16.6 % 18.6 % 22.9 % 20.2% 25.8 %
F 1.01 1.10 1.37 1.17 1.52
F (signiﬁcant controls only) 2.09 2.64 3.13 2.86 4.72
OLS, (t-values in parenthesis). Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01).
Dependent variable day 0 buyer Market Adjusted abnormal returns; n = 141
29Table 5: Hierarchical Regression for Day 0 Abnormal Market Model Returns
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
β0: Intercept -0.023
(-0.45)
-0.034
(-0.66)
-0.024
(-0.48)
0.001
(0.01)
0.024
(0.44)
β1: Buyer Market Value
(billion US$)
0.003
(0.04)
0.009
(0.10)
-0.001
(-0.01)
-0.009
(-0.11)
-0.026
(-0.31)
β2: Buyer Free Cash Intensity
(Free Cash/Sales)
-0.023
(-0.69)
-0.028
(-0.85)
-0.045
(-1.38)
-0.029
(-0.90)
-0.049
(-1.54)
β3: Buyer R&D Intensity
(R&D/Sales)
0.015
(0.20)
0.015
(0.21)
-0.010
(-0.13)
0.032
(0.43)
0.009
(0.13)
β4: Buyer Leverage
(Debt / Assets)
0.087
(1.58)
0.085
(1.57)
0.088∗
(1.66)
0.074
(1.36)
0.074
(1.40)
β5: Buyer Acquisition Experience
(prior acquisitions x 10−3)
-0.163
(-0.42)
-0.276
(-0.71)
-0.428
(-1.11)
-0.128
(-0.32)
-0.251
(-0.65)
β6: Log of Target Employees -0.001
(-0.20)
0.004
(0.51)
0.002
(0.27)
0.003
(0.48)
0.001
(0.19)
β7: Target Private
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.006
(0.42)
0.005
(0.36)
0.009
(0.63)
-0.001
(-0.01)
0.002
(0.15)
β8: Target Patent Presence
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.045∗∗
(2.38)
0.050∗∗
(2.62)
0.056∗∗∗
(3.02)
0.042∗∗
(2.18)
0.048∗∗
(2.52)
β9: Target Patent Stock
(log depreciated cites)
-0.008∗
(-1.85)
-0.008∗
(-1.87)
-0.008∗∗
(-2.03)
-0.006
(-1.51)
-0.007
(-1.58)
β10: Acquisition Weight x 103
(Acq. Val. / Buyer Val.)
-0.024
(-1.10)
-0.026
(-1.23)
-0.032
(-1.55)
-0.022
(-1.04)
-0.028
(-1.35)
β11: Acquisition Value
(billion US$)
-0.002
(-0.80)
-0.002
(-0.94)
-0.001
(-0.75)
-0.002
(-1.04)
-0.002
(-0.87)
β12: Payment Method
(1 if stock, 0 if cash)
0.002
(0.18)
-0.001
(-0.00)
-0.003
(-0.27)
-0.002
(-0.14)
-0.006
(-0.50)
β13: Prior Relationship
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.008
(-0.62)
-0.004
(-0.33)
-0.006
(-0.50)
-0.006
(-0.46)
-0.009
(-0.70)
β14: Post Bubble (March 2000)
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.018
(1.45)
0.020
(1.62)
0.022∗
(1.85)
0.019
(1.53)
0.021∗
(1.75)
β15: Early Mover
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.008
(-0.28)
0.002
(-0.09)
0.007
(0.26)
-0.002
(-0.08)
0.009
(0.33)
β16: S&P 500 Index
(/1000)
-24.555
(-0.28)
-19.303
(-0.61)
-0.412
(-0.01)
-24.799
(-0.78)
-5.060
(-0.16)
Fixed Eﬀects
(for frequent acquirers)
yes yes yes yes yes
β17: Log of Target Age
(years)
-0.011
(-1.60)
-0.027∗∗∗
(-2.99)
-0.022∗∗
(-2.24)
-0.044∗∗∗
(-3.69)
β18: Patent*log Target Age 0.032∗∗∗
(2.66)
0.026∗∗
(2.14)
β19: Private*log Target Age 0.019
(1.56)
0.037∗∗∗
(3.05)
R2 18.5 % 20.3 % 24.9 % 21.9% 27.8 %
F 1.16 1.23 1.53 1.29 1.69
F (signiﬁcant controls only) 2.01 2.65 3.33 2.52 4.87
OLS, (t-values in parenthesis). Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01).
Dependent variable day 0 buyer Market Model abnormal returns; n = 141
30and performed the hierarchical regressions separately for each group. The results are
reported in Table 6 (Models 1, 2, 3 and 4). As predicted by Hypothesis 2, there is a
strong negative relationship between target age and acquirer value when the patent
indicator is 0 (target has no patents), and there is no such relationship when the
target has patents. Interestingly, the control variables predict a signiﬁcantly higher
percentage of the variance for the sub-group of data points where the target has
patents, and the R2 of the regression is much higher for that sub-group. Figure 2
illustrates the diﬀering returns for targets with and without patents based on the
parameter estimates in Table 6 (Models 2 and 4). While the abnormal market reaction
for targets with patents is independent of age, the abnormal market reaction for
targets without patents exhibits signiﬁcant loss of value for the buyer as the target
age increases.
The results in Table 4 and Table 5 also show support for Hypothesis 3. The coeﬃ-
cient for the interaction term is not signiﬁcant in Model 4 for both the Market Model
and the Market Adjusted Returns.; however, we do see signiﬁcance in the complete
model. Overall, we see evidence that private status mutes the negative impact of tar-
get age on value created for the buyer. To further analyze the relationships between
target age, private status and value creation for the acquirer, we separated the data
points into two groups based on the private status indicator variable and performed
the hierarchical regressions separately for each group. The results are reported in Ta-
ble 7 (Models 5, 6, 7 and 8). As predicted by Hypothesis 3, there is a strong negative
relationship between target age and acquirer value when the private indicator is 0
(target is public) despite limited statistical power due to the reduce sample size (n =
47), and there is no such relationship when the target is private. Figure 2 illustrates
the diﬀering returns for private and public targets based on the parameter estimates
in Table 7 (Models 6 and 8). While the abnormal market reaction for private tar-
gets is independent of age, the abnormal market reaction for public targets exhibits
31Table 6: Hierarchical Models of Day 0 Market Adjusted Returns for Patent Split
Sample Analysis
Without Patents With Patents
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
β0: Intercept -0.045
(-0.38)
-0.054
(-0.49)
-0.084
(-1.17)
-0.083
(-1.14)
β1: Buyer Market Value
(billion US$)
0.072
(0.62)
0.056
(0.51)
0.149
(0.98)
0.139
(0.90)
β2: Buyer Free Cash Intensity
(Free Cash/Sales)
0.017
(0.25)
-0.034
(-0.50)
-0.058
(-1.51)
-0.058
(-1.50)
β3: Buyer R&D Intensity
(R&D/Sales)
0.013
(0.10)
-0.033
(-0.27)
0.117
(1.09)
0.110
(1.01)
β4: Buyer Leverage
(Debt / Assets)
0.343∗∗∗
(3.55)
0.337∗∗∗
(3.70)
0.009
(0.13)
0.008
(0.11)
β5: Buyer Acquisition Exp.
(prior acquisitions x 10−3)
0.063
(0.10)
-0.498
(-0.82)
-1.005
(-1.59)
-0.939
(-1.44)
β6: Log of Target Employees 0.003
(0.21)
0.010
(0.62)
0.013∗
(1.73)
0.011
(1.24)
β7: Target Private
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.004
(-0.12)
-0.008
(-0.23)
0.027 (1.63) 0.028
(1.66)
β8: Target Patent Presence
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
β9: Target Patent Stock
(log depreciated cites)
-0.005
(-1.29)
-0.005
(-1.24)
β10: Acquisition Weight x 103
(Acq. Val. / Buyer Val.)
0.104
(1.64)
0.081
(1.36)
-0.053∗∗
(-2.34)
-0.052∗∗
(-2.24)
β11: Acquisition Value
(billion US$)
-0.006
(-0.60)
-0.010
(-1.08)
-0.004∗∗
(-2.07)
-0.004∗
(-1.92)
β12: Payment Method
(1 if stock, 0 if cash)
0.016
(0.58)
0.003
(0.12)
-0.021
(-1.42)
-0.020
(-1.35)
β13: Prior Relationship
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.005
(0.22)
0.010
(0.45)
-0.001
(-0.02)
-0.002
(-0.13)
β14: Post Bubble
(1 if pre-Mar 2000, 0 if not)
0.012
(0.59)
0.024
(1.20)
0.041∗∗
(2.54)
0.040∗∗
(2.49)
β15: Early Mover
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.033
(-0.48)
-0.014
(-0.21)
0.030 (1.04) 0.030
(1.03)
β16: S&P 500 Index
(/1000)
112.226∗
(-1.92)
-73.066
(-1.29)
22.170
(0.56)
21.832
(0.55)
Fixed Eﬀects
(for frequent acquirers)
yes yes yes yes
β17: Log of Target Age
(years)
-0.031∗∗
(-2.67)
0.004
(0.45)
N 68 68 73 73
R2 34.6 % 43.3 % 44.8 % 45.0%
F 1.24 1.68 1.84 1.74
F (signiﬁcant controls only) 0.31 5.58 3.46 0.17
OLS, (t-values in parenthesis). Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01).
Dependent variable day 0 buyer Market Adjusted abnormal returns
32Table 7: Hierarchical Models of Day 0 Market Adjusted Returns for Private Split
Sample Analysis
Public Private
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
β0: Intercept -0.009
(-0.06)
-0.151
(-1.03)
-0.013
(-0.17)
-0.004
(-0.05)
β1: Buyer Market Value
(billion US$)
0.316
(0.78)
0.086
(0.23)
0.002
(0.03)
-0.001
(-0.01)
β2: Buyer Free Cash Intensity
(Free Cash/Sales)
0.003
(0.05)
-0.057
(-0.94)
0.003
(0.04)
0.003
(0.04)
β3: Buyer R&D Intensity
(R&D/Sales)
0.050
(0.26)
0.184
(1.02)
0.014
(0.12)
0.017
(0.15)
β4: Buyer Leverage
(Debt / Assets)
0.064
(0.46)
0.097
(0.77)
0.092
(1.15)
0.088
(1.09)
β5: Buyer Acquisition Exp.
(prior acquisitions x 10−3)
-1.216
(-0.84)
-0.977
(-0.74)
-0.321
(-0.70)
-0.277
(-0.58)
β6: Log of Target Employees 0.010
(0.74)
0.029∗
(2.02)
-0.012
(-1.23)
-0.014
(-1.19)
β7: Target Private
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
β8: Target Patent Presence
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.026
(0.44)
0.014
(0.25)
0.080∗∗∗
(3.45)
0.078∗∗∗
(3.22)
β9: Target Patent Stock
(log depreciated cites)
-0.008
(-0.66)
0.004
(0.35)
-0.016∗∗∗
(-2.80)
-0.016∗∗∗
(-2.71)
β10: Acquisition Weight x 103
(Acq. Val. / Buyer Val.)
-0.073
(-1.72)
-0.063
(-1.64)
0.141∗∗
(2.57)
0.141∗∗
(2.55)
β11: Acquisition Value
(billion US$)
-0.003
(-0.72)
-0.006
(-1.62)
-0.002
(-0.24)
-0.001
(-0.14)
β12: Payment Method
(1 if stock, 0 if cash)
-0.025
(-0.85)
-0.045
(-1.61)
0.005
(0.30)
0.004
(0.24)
β13: Prior Relationship
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.005
(0.18)
0.001
(0.01)
-0.008
(-0.49)
-0.010
(-0.56)
β14: Post Bubble
(1 if pre-Mar 2000, 0 if not)
0.018
(0.56)
0.025
(0.86)
0.017
(1.16)
0.017
(1.12)
β15: Early Mover
(1 if yes, 0 if no)
-0.028
(-0.51)
0.007
(0.13)
0.017
(0.40)
0.015
(0.36)
β16: S&P 500 Index
(/1000)
-50.815
(-0.45)
25.707
(0.24)
-6.066
(-0.17)
-8.473
(-0.22)
Fixed Eﬀects
(for frequent acquirers)
yes yes yes yes
β17: Log of Target Age
(years)
-0.043∗∗
(-2.55)
0.003
(0.31)
N 47 47 94 94
R2 27.8% 43.7% 27.8% 28.9 %
F 0.42 0.78 1.24 1.18
F (signiﬁcant controls only) 0.85 7.75 1.30 0.12
OLS, (t-values in parenthesis). Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01).
Dependent variable day 0 buyer Market Adjusted abnormal returns
33Figure 2: Marginal Impact of Target Age and Intellectual Property on Abnormal
Reaction
34signiﬁcant loss of value as the target ages.
Another interesting observation arises from the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
associated with the patent stock variable in all results reported. There are two ex-
planations for this. First, highly cited patents indicate highly visible technologies,
increasing the likelihood of a higher price for the target. The correlation between
acquisition value and patent stock in Table 2 is 0.492. Second, higher patent stock
values are associated with older clients with mature R&D processes and consequently
less synergy from the acquisition. The correlation between patent stock and target
age is 0.485 in Table 2.
In the results reported in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7, the large number
of non-signiﬁcant controls included in the regressions result in lower F values. It
is important to include the controls to account for known eﬀects on value creation
and accurately evaluate our hypotheses. However, to evaluate model ﬁt, we dropped
the non-signiﬁcant controls from the regressions and recalculated the F values. The
coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance of model variables remain similar and the resulting F
values are also reported in the tables.
2.5 Summary and Implications
In the high velocity environment of the telecommunications industry, the equity mar-
kets reward the acquisition of younger companies. However, patent ownership by
the target mutes the negative impact of target age on value creation for the buyer,
indicating strategic renewal of older targets through the presence of R&D. Thus, the
equity markets strongly penalize the acquisition of older companies that do not own
patents. Similarly, a target’s privately held status mutes the negative impact of tar-
get age, indicating synergistic value for even older private targets from the superior
resources of a publicly held buyer. Thus, the equity markets penalize the acquisition
of older public companies. The results are robust under alternative deﬁnitions of
35abnormal returns, are not based on a few frequent acquirers, and are consistent with
a real options perspective on value creation in high velocity industries.
Beyond the main ﬁndings of the research outlined above, our empirical results
also provide another interesting insight. None of the ﬁnancial variables in the model
are signiﬁcant in the regression results in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7.
Empirical research on acquisitions in other industries has consistently demonstrated
lower acquirer returns for public targets (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002) and when
equity is used to ﬁnance the transaction (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). However, both of
these variables are not signiﬁcant in any of the regression models; however the private
status of a target reduces the negative impact of target age. In addition, in contrast to
earlier ﬁndings Andrade et al. (2001), the variables related to free cash ﬂow and debt
are also not signiﬁcant. The only control variables that are signiﬁcant in the model
are related to target patent ownership and intellectual property. The low explanatory
power of traditional control variables indicate that the drivers of acquisitions in the
high technology industries are not captured through these variables, emphasizing the
need for a fresh perspective.
Our empirical results also conﬁrm the value of ﬂexibility highlighted in the prod-
uct development literature Bhattacharya et al. (1998); Krishnan and Bhattacharya
(2002). Acquisition of younger targets enables the creation of a portfolio of technolo-
gies that allows for opportunistic evolution and experimentation, as more information
becomes available about evolving market needs. In dynamic environments, this ﬂex-
ibility is valuable and is reﬂected in the higher valuation attached to the acquisition
of younger targets and the role of target patents in muting the negative impact of
target age.
362.5.1 Limitations
It is also important to emphasize two limitations of this study that indicate opportu-
nities for future research. First, while event study methods utilized in this research
demonstrate the advantages of acquiring early, market evaluations are imperfect mea-
sures of true value, even in eﬃcient markets. Thus, it remains to be seen if the advan-
tages of acquiring early translate to long term and sustainable competitive advantage.
The use of detailed accounting or survey data on long term acquisition performance
will provide additional insights. However, since ﬁrms make many acquisitions in a
year, it will be diﬃcult to separate out the eﬀects of each acquisition on long term
performance.
Second, our data is limited to acquisitions made by equipment manufacturers
within the telecommunications industry. While the single industry focus has advan-
tages, it also behooves us to analyze the boundary conditions of our ﬁndings. The
rationale for the hypotheses examined here is rooted in the technical and market
uncertainties prevalent in some environments. Conditions that foster technical un-
certainties include a high rate of technological innovation, disruptive technologies,
and emerging standards. Conditions that foster market uncertainties include time-
to-market pressures, unpredictable demand, low switching costs, emerging markets,
and hypercompetitive environments with multiple players. The convergence of both
of these uncertainties creates a high velocity environment where the beneﬁts of acting
quickly outweigh the risks of such action. It is to such environments that may evolve
in other industries at later times that our results can be extended.
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CHOICE AND CHANCE: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF
PATHS TO INFORMATION SECURITY COMPROMISE
3.1 Introduction
With the growing importance of information security in the current environment,
there has been increased interest in the topic in the academic literature. The vast
technical literature, especially in the computer science area, has focused on the de-
velopment of technologies to secure computer systems, such as secure networking
protocols (DiPietro and Mancini, 2003), intrusion detection techniques (Ning et al.,
2004), database security methods (Sarathy and Muralidhar, 2002), and access control
technologies (Sandhu and Samarati, 1996). Sociologists have studied the computer
hacker community, investigating issues such as hacker motivation (Voiskounsky and
Smyslova, 2003), hacker actions (Embar-Seddon, 2002), and typical hacker proﬁles
(Halbert, 1997). From an economics perspective, researchers have examined the cost-
beneﬁts of information security (Gordon and Loeb, 2002), optimal models for vulner-
ability disclosure (Arora et al., 2004b; Kannan and Telang, 2005), and the impact of
security breaches on the market value of the ﬁrm (Cavusoglu et al., 2004).
At the same time, the trade literature emphasizes that information security is
not merely a task for technical professionals sequestered behind computer screens.
A common theme is that ”security...starts at the top, not with ﬁrewalls, shielded
cables, or biometrics” (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002). Similarly, there is a growing
trend of senior executive involvement in computer security (Lohmeyer et al., 2002).
Recognizing its importance, recent regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley (Schultz, 2004)
38and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act1 (Speers et al., 2004)
provide penalties for failing to address security considerations. Clearly, information
security has moved closer to the top of the management agenda.
Consequently, a new perspective on information security, that we term the orga-
nizational perspective, is emerging in the information systems (IS) literature. The
organizational perspective focuses on the managerial processes that control the ef-
fective deployment of technical solutions, tools, resources and personnel to create a
secure computing environment in an organization. The perspective is that of busi-
ness managers charged with securing the information technology (IT) assets of the
enterprise. In this perspective, technical solutions are important, but the focus is on
managerial actions that promote a secure information environment.
Early work on information security in the IS area identiﬁed the managerial chal-
lenges in implementing security (Boockholdt, 1989), the eﬀectiveness of security coun-
termeasures (Straub, 1990), discovering and disciplining IS abuse (Straub and Nance,
1990), the unique threats that exist in a networked environment (Loch et al., 1992),
and security methods in systems development (Baskerville, 1993). More recent re-
search has focused on employee attitudes towards computer ethics (Banerjee et al.,
1998; Harrington, 1996), the characteristics of workers involved in IS abuse (Gattiker
and Kelley, 1999), and security planning models (Straub and Welke, 1998). Dhillon
and Backhouse (2001) provide a synthesis of this research stream.
Even though information security has been consistently identiﬁed at the top of
the IS agenda (Brancheau et al., 1996), research on the organizational perspective
is limited but emerging. Consequently, we focus this chapter on the organizational
perspective of information security. Our purpose is to develop a conceptual model of
1Both Sarbanes-Oxley and HIPAA specify that management is ultimately responsible for the
security, accuracy and privacy of information relating to corporate ﬁnancial records and individual
health records, respectively.
39the information security compromise process (ISCP) from the perspective of the tar-
get organization, and to validate empirically some of the key elements of the model.
We conduct the research in two phases. First, we use a grounded approach (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967) that utilizes interviews, observations, web searches, and document
reviews to identify the constructs relevant to the ISCP, and propose a conceptual
model that links the constructs into paths to information security compromise. Sec-
ond, we utilize a large dataset of information security alerts to validate some of the
key concepts of our grounded model. The alert data is generated by placing sensors
within the corporate networks of several hundred clients of a managed security service
provider (MSSP).
Our model and empirical ﬁndings articulate three important and related concepts.
First, attacks are part of a process rather than a single event as they build on each
other. Second, the ISCP has two distinct paths (deliberate and opportunistic) that
have diﬀerent antecedents and characteristics, but merge with the opportunistic path
leading to the deliberate path. Finally, organizational countermeasures play a mod-
erating rather than a direct role to deter the progression of attacks in each path.
Speciﬁcally, we argue that some countermeasure practices (e.g. vulnerability patch-
ing) are most eﬀective in the early stages of the ISCP, while other practices (e.g.
traﬃc ﬁltering) are more eﬀective during the later stages.
There are two broad contributions of this research to the emerging literature on
the organizational perspective of information security. First, at this early stage of em-
pirical research in this area, a conceptual model that identiﬁes the main constructs
and their inter-relationships is central to the development of a research stream that
can ultimately inﬂuence practice (Whetten, 1989). Such a model builds a cumulative
tradition of knowledge and integrates empirical research into a cogent and comprehen-
sive whole, rather than a piecemeal eﬀort (Weber, 2002; Zmud, 1998). Moreover, the
process perspective underlying our conceptual model allows us to categorize attacks
40in a manner that highlights their progression to information security compromise.
This provides for a ﬁner grained analysis of the role of countermeasures at various
stages of the process, and clariﬁes the role of antecedents. Empirical research on
the eﬃcacy of countermeasures and the impact of antecedents is a crucial missing
element in the literature on information security (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001; Sipo-
nen, 2005). A conceptual model provides guidance in developing empirical constructs
and evaluating their nomological validity.
Second, our analysis of alert data provides insights to IS researchers that can
lead to a more detailed analysis of this important data source. Similar datasets have
been used in the computer science literature to analyze attack characteristics from
a technical perspective (Kemmerer and Vigna, 2002). However the primary goals
have been to develop methods for eﬃcient handling of alert data through aggregation
(Julisch, 2003; Ning et al., 2004), and to develop automated data mining tools for
identifying attacks in progress (Dickersen et al., 2001). We are unaware of research
using alert data to validate a conceptual model of the attack process developed from
the perspective of a target organization.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 brieﬂy describes the
research methodology. Section 3.3 discusses the results of interviews, observations,
and document reviews, and presents our conceptual model. Section 3.4 describes the
analysis of alert data to validate empirically the key concepts in our model. Section 3.5
concludes the chapter and outlines its implications for future research.
3.2 Research Methodology And Conceptual Model
3.2.1 Information Security Research Environment
The connection of individual computers and systems into a global network has cre-
ated unprecedented opportunities for electronic commerce and information sharing.
41Unfortunately, it also has created unprecedented opportunities for attack. As net-
works and applications have grown, so too have the variety and volume of attacks,
including both automated and manual threats. For example, viruses attached to ﬁles
and e-mails replicate to take over systems and networks. Similarly, worms spread
quickly through systems and, even if they do not intrinsically cause damage, can en-
cumber network resources. In contrast, individual attackers may try to gain access
to speciﬁc resources through, for example, SQL injection, in which they pass along
Structured Query Language (SQL) statements in response to Web input requests to
compromise underlying databases. From a low-tech angle, attackers engaged in social
engineering attempt to exploit weaknesses in people rather than in systems by, for
example, pretending to be an IT support worker and asking a user to verify his or
her password.
Like frantic Pandoras, systems professionals attempt to contain the risks of at-
tack without destroying the opportunities for electronic commerce and information
sharing. For example, they partition networks with ﬁrewalls (analogous to physical
barriers that prevent ﬁre from spreading from one part of a building to another),
mandate the use of antivirus software, and constantly balance operational concerns
while updating systems with patches to address vulnerabilities. The complexity and
scope of the problem have led to the specialization of dedicated security professionals.
Similar to many other IT services, security services frequently are outsourced,
which has led to the development of managed security service providers (MSSP).
An MSSP takes responsibility for some of the information security functions that
organizations need and provides these services to many organizations. Because it
often can take advantage of economies of scale, an MSSP provides expertise and
experience that may be diﬃcult or expensive to maintain internally. Thereby, MSSPs
gain invaluable experience from their exposure to compromise attempts on a wide
variety of potential victims.
42Figure 3: The Information Security Research Environment
A speciﬁc action that security professionals often take is to install monitoring
devices that monitor and stop unwanted network traﬃc. Figure 3 shows a sample
network conﬁguration that includes an MSSP whose network monitors are designed
to identify potential attacks and suspicious activity. Such identiﬁcation, a key com-
ponent of protection, frequently occurs through signatures, which are data traﬃc
patterns that indicate a possible problem. As new threats and vulnerabilities appear,
they are distilled into signatures that are distributed to the network monitors, which
in turn improves the monitors’ ability to analyze and respond to threats. Not all
signatures correspond to deﬁnite attacks; some may indicate simply suspicious activ-
ity or activity that could be benign in isolation but be considered an attack when
combined with another activity. For example, a request for a Web page is usually a
benign activity. However, combined with many similar requests in a short period of
time, it could indicate a denial of a service attack. Signatures are classiﬁed along a
continuum from deﬁnitively benign to deﬁnitively problematic.
43Another key component of the security environment involves the security profes-
sionals who monitor the traﬃc on the network using the signature-based classiﬁcation
generated by the network monitors. On the basis of their prior experience, current
information about viruses and attacks, and similar activity at other sites, the security
professionals make decisions about possible actions that might mitigate risk. Secu-
rity professionals also use data from the monitors to improve signatures and signature
classiﬁcations, storing suspicious bit streams in a database for later analysis.
3.2.2 Theoretical Perspectives
A vast literature in sociology, criminology and economics provides various theories and
perspectives on crime and its consequences. A comprehensive review of this literature
clearly is beyond the scope of this chapter; instead, we focus on the relevance and
limitations of the traditional theories in the context of the ISCP (Table 8).
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45Theories that are related to rational choice view crime as an economic phenomenon
with rational criminals who weigh the cost-beneﬁts of criminal activity (Ehrlich, 1973,
1996). The distinguishing feature of this literature is the attempt to study criminal
behavior through the familiar tools of equilibrium analysis (Ehrlich, 1996). In a
similar vein, routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) identiﬁes three pre-
requisites for criminal activity-motivated oﬀenders, suitable targets and the absence
of capable guardians to protect targets. These theories emphasize countermeasures in
reducing the incidence of crime, by hardening targets or raising negative consequences.
However, anonymity, proliferation of tools and the diﬃculties in enforcement have
reduced the cost of crime signiﬁcantly in the Internet context.
A large class of theories in criminology, such as the theory of diﬀerential asso-
ciation (Sutherland, 1947), the theory of social learning (Akers et al., 1979), and
subculture theories (Cohen, 1955) proposes that criminal behavior is learned through
association with others. Such learning occurs within intimate personal groups and
involves learning both the detailed techniques of committing the crime as well as a
general attitude that views the crime favorably. In the context of the ISCP, these
theories emphasize the importance of the hacker subculture in inﬂuencing attacker
behavior and providing motivation and tools; but the disparate groups involved in
attacks makes it diﬃcult to identify and understand these sub-groups.
Social control theories focus on strategies to reinforce compliance with the rules
of society (Braithwaite, 1989; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). These theories often
focus on laws and other formal control systems, but also emphasize informal bonds
that tie individuals to societal norms. The applicability of these theories is limited in
the ISCP context because of the diﬃculties in the enforcement of laws, the anonymity
of the criminal, and the diversity of possible attackers.
To aid in understanding its dynamics and temporal evolution, theories that focus
on the victim rather than the criminal often advocate that victimization should be
46conceptualized as a process rather than a single event (Bowling, 1993; McShane and
Williams, 1997). The contexts that are studied include racial, sexual and child abuse
where repeat victimization is the norm. However, while these theories emphasize the
process of victimization, since the process is dependent on the context, the identiﬁed
processes cannot be readily applied in the ISCP context.
Theories of organizational crime typically focus on white collar crime (Sutherland,
1947) committed by individuals of high social status on behalf of or against an orga-
nization. Theories of white-collar crime focus on the coincidence of motivation and
opportunity as an explanation for criminal behavior (Coleman, 1987). There are simi-
larities in motivation with the ISCP context such as personal enrichment, conforming
to the norms of a subculture, and rationalization of criminal behavior by deviating
blame (Coleman, 1987). However, white-collar crime theories focus on occupational
crime that is committed by persons connected with the ﬁrm in the course of their
normal occupation, limiting its relevance to the anonymous environment of the ISCP.
3.2.3 Unique Characteristics of the Information Security Environment
Three speciﬁc diﬀerences between the ISCP and the general crime context highlight
the need for a conceptual model that draws from previous literature, but also takes
into account the unique characteristics of the ISCP environment (Whetten, 1989).
The ﬁrst diﬀerence lies in the diﬃculty with enforcement of laws in the ISCP context.
The anonymity provided by the Internet, the physical remoteness of the attacker, and
the subsequent challenges of multi-jurisdictional coordination of enforcement alter re-
lationships borrowed from traditional criminology such as the impact of punishment in
classical criminology (Ehrlich, 1996), or shame in Braithwaite’s re-integrative shaming
theory (Braithwaite, 1989). The second diﬀerence is that the reach of the Internet has
led to the wide distribution of automated tools for attacking information resources
47and to a wide variety of people involved in the attack process. Consequently, tar-
get ﬁrms face a constant barrage of incidents where the attacker is merely relying
on chance to ﬁnd and exploit vulnerability (Willison, 2002). The factors that drive
such random incidents are diﬀerent from those that drive the more deliberate inci-
dents that have been the focus of traditional criminology. The third diﬀerence lies
in the perspective, which in the case of the ISCP is that of the target organization.
While the criminology literature has extensively examined the victimization process
in contexts such as racial, sexual and child abuse where repeat victimization is com-
mon (McShane and Williams, 1997), the ISCP is obviously distinctive in terms of the
stages and progression of attacks, leading to a distinct set of constructs and processes.
3.2.4 Grounded Research Method
We develop the conceptual model of the ISCP through the iterative investigation of
four primary sources of information: 1) observations of MSSP operations, 2) inter-
views with information security experts, 3) reviews of postings in Internet discussion
groups to understand attacker motivation and modus operandi, and (4) reviews of IS
security related guidelines and best practices from industry organizations. Table 9
and Figure 4 describes the grounded process we followed in developing the concep-
tual model (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The table shows
the data sources and the rationale for their use (theoretical sampling), the method
followed in identifying the constructs (open coding), their relationships (axial coding)
and their dimensions (selective coding), as well as the resulting model elements.
3.3 A Conceptual Model Of The ISCP
3.3.1 A Typology of Security Incidents
The computer science literature provides methods for classifying attacks based on the
speciﬁc technical vulnerabilities that the attack seeks to exploit. In a comprehensive
taxonomy, Chakrabarti and Manimaran (2002) identify four basic categories: DNS
48Table 9: Combining Data Sources through the Grounded Theory Approach
Data Source Observations Interviews Document
Reviews
Discussion
Groups
Details Observation
of activities at
an MSSP data
center
Interviews
with 30 IS se-
curity experts
from 8 target
ﬁrms
Review of
security guide-
lines from
multiple orga-
nizations
Review of over
150 postings
on hacker
motivation /
operations
Theoretical Sampling: choosing data sources based on the needs of the emerging
theory
Rationale for
use of data
source
A MSSP faces
a wide range
of security
alerts due to a
diverse client
base
Security ex-
perts can
provide details
of the attack
process from
the target
viewpoint
Guidelines
represent best
practices in
organizational
counter-
measures
Eﬃcient and
non-intrusive
way to reach
persons who
attack com-
puter systems
Comparative Method: comparing new data with emerging theory and assessing ﬁt
Open Cod-
ing
Identifying
constructs
Compared
MSSP re-
actions to
security alerts
to classify
security inci-
dents
Analyzed ex-
pert responses
to identify con-
structs that
aﬀect security
compromise
Axial Cod-
ing
Identifying as-
sociations
Observations and interviews
provided the relationships be-
tween high-level constructs
(internet presence, 2X2 attack
typology. Countermeasures,
attractiveness)
Selective
Coding
Identifying
construct
dimensions
Compared
security
guidelines
to identify the
dimensions of
Organizational
Countermea-
sures
Compared
postings to
identify the
dimensions of
Attractiveness
and Presence
Outcome of the Grounded Process
Resulting
Model Ele-
ments
Four types of attacks (At-
tack Scans, Info Scans, Tar-
geted Probes and Targeted At-
tacks) and the other major
constructs (Countermeasures,
Internet Presence and Attrac-
tiveness).
The complete conceptual
model in Figure 6 with the
dimensions of each construct.
49Figure 4: Research Process Summary
hacking, route table poisoning, packet mistreatment and denial of service attacks.
Howard (1998) provides a results-oriented classiﬁcation scheme that also identiﬁes
four basic categories: corruption of information, disclosure of information, theft of
service and denial of service. Other similar classiﬁcations appear in DeLooze (2004)
and Kemmerer and Vigna (2002).
To generate a parsimonious conceptual model, we employed a pragmatic reduction
(Bailey, 1994) of the attack categories in the literature by abstracting to two dimen-
sions that were of relevance from the perspective of the target organization, either
in terms of actions they take in response, or the antecedents that drive these at-
tacks. First, alerts exhibited a range of immediacy of attack. Some alerts represented
deﬁnitive attempts at compromise in progress that resulted in immediate action by
the security operators at the target organization. At the other end of the range, some
alerts represented reconnaissance attempts that could not be ﬁltered without seriously
hampering legitimate activity. Thus, this ﬁrst dimension captured the dichotomy in
the actions typically taken by the target organization in response to the attack. Sec-
ond, we identify an additional dimension that is important for our analysis— target
speciﬁcity. This dimension represented whether the activity targeted a speciﬁc ﬁrm,
or whether it was indiscriminate. As we demonstrate later, this dimension allows us
50- ￿
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?
Compromise
Attempt
Reconnaissance
Attempt
Targeted
Non-Targeted
Targeted Attacks Targeted Probes
Attack Scans Info Scans
Figure 5: A Typology of Information Security Alerts
to separate out two paths of attack that have distinct antecedents in the conceptual
model.
Using these two dimensions, we developed a typology (Figure 5 and Table 10)
with the four possible permutations. First, non-targeted low severity attacks, labeled
information scans, gather information about systems and services, such as a simple
check to see if any machine responds at a particular IP address. Second, targeted
low severity attacks, labeled targeted probes, test a speciﬁc set of potential victims
for vulnerabilities. Third, non-targeted high severity attacks, labeled attack scans,
are widespread, indiscriminate attempts to damage systems, such as a self-replicating
worm. Fourth, targeted high severity attacks, labeled targeted attacks, represent a
severe attempt to compromise a speciﬁc system.
51Table 10: Attack Typology Examples
Constructed
Type
Empirical Example from Alert Signatures
Information
Scan
Using TCP/IP ping to see if an IP address has a computer
Attack Scan Blaster worm which exploits a remote procedure call vulnerabil-
ity
Targeted Probe Port scanning a speciﬁc computer to see what services are run-
ning
Targeted Attack Using SQL injection to create unauthorized database account
3.3.2 The Primary Constructs in the Conceptual Model
We conducted unstructured interviews with a 30 IS security staﬀ from 8 organizations
of four diﬀerent types (3 North American ﬁnancial institutions, 2 managed security
providers, 2 large Western European based non-governmental organizations, and 2
universities). We explained to the participants that the fundamental question of our
study was “Why are some organizations attacked more than others?” and we asked
them to base their responses on their professional expertise without revealing any
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
As we progressed through the interviews, we found that three constructs aﬀect the
incidence of the four attack categories described in the previous section: the size of the
ﬁrm’s Internet presence (Internet presence), the eﬃcacy of the countermeasures put in
place (Organizational countermeasures), and its overall attractiveness to attackers as a
target based on ﬁrm speciﬁc factors (Perceived attractiveness). Further, in describing
these constructs, interviewees identiﬁed two fundamental attack paths that diﬀered
in terms of their antecedents. The ﬁrst represents deliberate attacks on a selected
victim, labeled choice. The second follows an opportunistic path, labeled chance.
3.3.3 The Path of Choice: Deliberate Compromise
Target attractiveness plays an important role in the deliberate path to compromise.
Interviewees consistently identiﬁed both the utility maximizing aspect of rational
52criminals, as well as a changing focus from status-based utility to ﬁnancial moti-
vation. As one interviewee from a ﬁnancial institution described, “Formerly there
was defacement, looking for high splash value. So, identiﬁable brands were targeted.
Now attacks follow money.” An interviewee from a ﬁnancial organization oﬀered the
summary that “Crooks do cost/beneﬁt analysis too.”
Persons who attack systems are an obviously diﬃcult group to reach. To obtain
a better understanding of the target attractiveness construct, we reviewed postings
in Usenet groups2 with keywords such as “hacker or attacker” and “motivation.” We
reviewed more than 150 such postings to reach theoretical saturation (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967), noted the major reasons behind attacking systems, and derived from
them the factors that make a target attractive. Sample quotes from the discussion
groups bring out three broad dimensions of target attractiveness (tangible, iconic and
reprisal value) that drive deliberate attacks.
Table 11 provides the deﬁnitions and details of these three dimensions, as well as
quotes from the discussion groups that point to them as antecedents in the deliberate
path to compromise.
2Groups include alt.2600.hackerz, alt.hacker, alt.hackers.malicious, comp.security.misc,
fa.ﬁrewall, among others.
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54Economic literature on criminal behavior also supports the relevance of tangible
value in the deliberate path to compromise. Clearly, the eﬀort required to compromise
a system must be commensurate with the perceived tangible beneﬁts for the attacker
(Becker, 1968; Schechter and Smith, 2003). Further, iconic and reprisal value of a
client inﬂuences the hacker subculture and is an antecedent in the deliberate path
in the Social Learning, Subculture & Labeling theories of crime in Table 8 (Akers
et al., 1979; Cohen and Felson, 1979). Thus, interviews, discussion group postings,
and criminology literature support the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Higher perceived attractiveness of the target ﬁrm (tangible, iconic
and reprisal value) is associated with a larger number of targeted probes.
3.3.4 The Path of Chance: Opportunistic Compromise
However, as the Internet has evolved, attacks are no longer the exclusive domain
of the expert. While expertise is needed initially to ﬁnd vulnerabilities and devise
techniques to use them, they are disseminated quickly as packaged tools, making the
expertise widely available. Then, these tools are used to ﬁnd vulnerable systems,
frequently by iterating through IP addresses. In these probes, the target is not pre-
selected; rather, the attacker ﬁnds victims who are vulnerable to a speciﬁc type of
attack. In this opportunistic path of compromise, the degree of Internet presence
inﬂuences the number of attacks. Internet presence does not only refer to the number
of visible IP addresses, but also to the number of servers, open ports, products of-
fered over the Internet, visitors to the website, and the volume of online advertising.
Demonstrating the idea that mere Internet presence leads to a certain level of attack,
many interviewees commented, “there is deﬁnitely an element of randomness in at-
tacks,” and that “most automated attacks are all out attacks with no scaling—there
is no reason not to try all at once.”
To identify the dimensions of Internet presence, we analyzed the typical tools used
55Table 12: Coding the INTERNET PRESENCE Construct and its Two Dimensions
Dimension Passive Presence Active Presence
Deﬁnition The number and functionality of
connections to the Internet
The volume and richness of Inter-
net activities
Details Passive presence is the size of
the organization’s Internet foot-
print. A larger footprint results in
a larger number of non-targeted at-
tacks that spread indiscriminately
across the Internet.
Active presence is aﬀected by the
Internet activities of an organiza-
tion. Richer and more frequent In-
ternet activity reveals more infor-
mation about the ﬁrm that can be
used in automated and targeted at-
tacks.
Examples The number of IP addresses, ports,
users, dial-in lines and hosts
Email Marketing campaigns and
online ads
Participation in discussion groups
& chat rooms
Electronic commerce activity with
partners
Tools Foot printing tools provide infor-
mation about reachable IP ad-
dresses, open ports, and services
running. A larger passive presence
leads to more connections to the
Internet that can be exploited
Vulnerability exploitation tools
provide the ability to exploit
known vulnerabilities. A larger
passive presence leads to more
attacks through such tools that
often indiscriminately blanket the
Internet.
Code breaking tools decipher en-
crypted transmission and pass-
words. Larger active presence
leads to more transmission that
can be deciphered.
Data sniﬃng tools enable the at-
tacker to examine transmission
content. Larger active presence
leads to more traﬃc that can be
intercepted.
System control tools enable the
attacker to control sessions and
hosts. Larger active presence leads
to more systems that can be ex-
ploited.
by attackers and their methods of operation. We conducted a search on the Usenet
discussion groups with combination of keywords such as “hacker,” “how to,” “tools”
and “method.” Often, discussion group postings pointed to websites where a variety
of tools are reviewed or made available. We identiﬁed ﬁve categories of tools shown
in Table 12. While reviewing these tools, we identiﬁed the factors that would make
a target more vulnerable to compromise. Through this process, we identiﬁed two
dimensions (Table 12) of Internet Presence— passive and active.
Passive Presence is the number and functionality of the Internet connections of a
56target ﬁrm. A larger passive presence on the Internet leads to more attacks through
the opportunistic path using the foot printing and vulnerability exploitation tools de-
scribed in Table 12. Foot printing tools enumerate reachable IP addresses, open ports,
and services running. Thus, a larger passive presence leads to a greater number of in-
formation scans generated through the foot printing tools. Vulnerability exploitation
tools provide the ability to exploit known vulnerabilities. A larger passive presence
leads to more attack scans through such tools that often indiscriminately blanket
the Internet to ﬁnd and exploit vulnerabilities opportunistically. In the criminology
literature, situational factors (such as living in a speciﬁc neighborhood or near a pub-
lic area) are recognized as determinants of victimization (Miethe and Meier, 1994),
and are analogous to passive presence in the Internet environment. With low search
costs, economic theory also predicts that attackers search extensively to identify easy
targets (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Ehrlich, 1996). Consequently, interviews, analysis
of tools, and existing criminology literature support the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Larger passive Internet presence of the target ﬁrm is associated with
a larger number of attack (A) and info (B) scans.
Active Presence, on the other hand, refers to the volume and types of Internet
activities performed by the ﬁrm and its stakeholders. Richer and more frequent
activity on the Internet reveals more information about the ﬁrm that can be used
in targeted attacks. As more data about the ﬁrm traverses the Internet, it provides
more information that attackers can exploit through data sniﬃng and code breaking
tools. It further identiﬁes more systems and sessions that the systems control tools
described in Table 12 can potentially manipulate. This was also noted by several
interviewees who said, “increased market presence leads to more attacks” and “the
number and types of products oﬀered [over the Internet] leads to more open ports,
more servers and more attacks.” Further, even in the traditional crime environment,
57variables associated with routine activities performed by a target aﬀect the chances of
victimization (Miethe and Meier, 1994). Thus, people are more likely to be assaulted
if they routinely go out at night or to dangerous places. Thus, interviews, analysis of
tools and the criminology literature support the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Larger active Internet presence of the target ﬁrm is associated with
a larger number of targeted probes.
3.3.5 Choice and Chance: Convergence of the Two Paths
Both widespread and directed attacks may be used in conjunction. Attackers can use
widespread, shotgun attacks to ﬁnd companies with vulnerabilities, and then from
a list of vulnerable companies, select speciﬁc companies for more directed attacks.
Interviewees from a MSSP with experience in analyzing a wide range of attacks in-
dicated that “results of reconnaissance scans can be used in two ways, both directly
and as a signal showing [a company is] likely to leave things open.” Thus, from scans,
an attacker develops a list of vulnerable targets, and, with this list, the attack may
turn from opportunistic to deliberate. While the convergence of the opportunistic
and deliberate paths of attack is a unique characteristic of the Internet environment,
there is also some support in the criminology literature. The Rational Choice and
related theories of crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Ehrlich, 1996) posit that criminals
are rational individuals who pursue easy targets. The foot printing and vulnerability
exploitation tools in Table 12 lower the cost of search and enable the identiﬁcation of
such targets through the opportunistic path. Once identiﬁed, the attack turns from
opportunistic to deliberate. Thus, the next proposition links the opportunistic and
deliberate paths of attack in the ISCP.
Proposition 4 Larger number of info scans at a target ﬁrm is associated with a
larger number of targeted probes.
583.3.6 Choice and Chance: Progression of Attacks
An overriding theme on how attacks are linked was summarized simply by an in-
terviewee at a ﬁnancial institution, as “attacks are a process” and by another at a
MSSP, as “attacks often start small, then graduate.” Thus, many interviewees de-
scribed a progression of an incident, starting with initial exploratory attempts, and
then using the knowledge gained from these attempts to compromise systems. In-
deed, foot printing tools in Table 12 enable targeted information gathering that may
appear innocuous and is diﬃcult to prevent without hampering legitimate activity;
this reconnaissance facilitates later targeted attacks. In the criminology literature,
especially in the racial, sexual and child abuse contexts where repeat victimization is
common, many authors have implicitly or explicitly argued that victimization should
be conceptualized as a process rather than a single event (Bowling, 1993; McShane
and Williams, 1997). Although the context is diﬀerent from the ISCP, this literature
also describes a progression of incidents with relatively minor to major impact. Thus,
information gathering progresses to compromise attempts.
Proposition 5 Larger number of targeted probes at a target ﬁrm is associated with
a larger number of targeted attacks.
Further, due to the evolving nature of information security attacks, protection is
necessarily imperfect and residual risk remains (Siponen, 2005; Straub and Welke,
1998) for three reasons. First, security technology is often error-prone, generating
many false positives and false negatives (Cavusoglu et al., 2005a). Second, as new
vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited, there is often a time lag in developing re-
medial countermeasures (Arora et al., 2004b). Third, target ﬁrms may also be slow in
adopting available countermeasures (Siponen, 2005; Straub and Welke, 1998). Thus,
as new attacks emerge, some will ﬁnd their way to information security compromise.
We add the following proposition to capture this residual risk.
59Proposition 6 Larger numbers of (A) targeted attacks and (B) attack scans at a
target ﬁrm are associated with a larger number of IS security compromises.
3.3.7 Organizational Countermeasures: Managing Threats
Information security practices seek to reduce risk by analyzing vulnerabilities and in-
stituting policies, procedures and technology to reduce the threat from cyber attacks.
Firms employ multiple countermeasures, as summarized by an interviewee from a
university: “Defense in depth is key— multiple layers including patch management,
ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection systems, and user training.” To understand the multi-
ple countermeasures used in practice and their role in the ISCP, we reviewed security
guidelines and best practices from multiple sources. Our primary data source were the
IS security guidelines published by the Department of Defense— Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA). We reviewed detailed security checklists (Defense Informa-
tion Systems Agency website, www.disa.mil) related to application security, network
security, desktop security, database security and server security. We also reviewed the
ISO 17799 speciﬁcations (Code of Practice for Information Security Management from
the International Standards Organization), and security guidelines from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (Bowen et al., 2005).
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61We categorized the guidelines into ﬁve dimensions (Table 13) and then further
decompose the dimensions into three main categories based on the stage of the ISCP
where they are likely to have the most impact. Traﬃc control and access control
measures rely on their ability to identify improper activity and restrict usage, such as
through attack signatures and access restriction policies. Their eﬃcacy in restricting
scans and probes is limited because, by deﬁnition, such activities can be legitimate
(albeit suspicious) and the target organization cannot stop them without hindering
other critical applications. Thus, traﬃc control and access control measures are most
eﬀective in reducing the progression of attack scans and targeted attacks to infor-
mation security compromise. On the other hand, vulnerability control and feature
control reduce the number of weaknesses found through informational scans and tar-
geted probes, reducing the progression of these reconnaissance activities. Another
category of countermeasures, audit control, does not have a direct eﬀect on the ISCP,
but improve the other countermeasures over time through monitoring and learning.
The following propositions reﬂect the moderating role of deterrence. Figure 6 sum-
marizes the conceptual model.
Proposition 7 Vulnerability and feature control measures moderate the relationship
between info scans and targeted probes (A) and between targeted probes and targeted
attacks (B). Firms with less eﬀective controls have a stronger relationship between
info scans and targeted probes (A) and between targeted probes and targeted attacks
(B).
Proposition 8 Access and traﬃc control measures moderate the relationship between
targeted attacks and security compromise (A) and between attack scans and security
compromise (B). Firms with less eﬀective controls have a stronger relationship between
targeted attacks and security compromise (A) and between attack scans and security
compromise (B).
62Figure 6: Conceptual Model of the ISCP
Proposition 9 Audit control measures do not directly aﬀect the ISCP, but improve
the other organizational countermeasures over time.
3.4 Emprical Examination Using Alert Data
3.4.1 The Data Set
We had partial access to a database of alert data provided to us by an Atlanta-
based MSSP, SecureWorks, Inc. There were approximately 847 million security alerts
for the one-year period from January 2006 until December 2006. The data set is
generated in real time by sensors (network monitors) that are installed by the MSSP
at the Internet entry points of the networks of their clients. The purpose of network
monitors is to identify potential attacks and suspicious activity. Identiﬁcation is done
through signatures, which are data traﬃc patterns that indicate a possible problem.
As new threats and vulnerabilities are uncovered, they are distilled into signatures
and distributed to the network monitors to improve their ability to identify threats.
For consistency of analysis, we restricted our analysis to the 364 million alerts
from the 821 clients who had only a single sensor located between their internal and
external network. Within the subset, 3,444 distinct signatures triggered at least one
63alert during the year. Signatures ranged from appearing in 1 to 54,365,983 alerts
with an average of 105,758 alerts per signature. Of the 821 possible clients, the
number of clients aﬀected per signature ranged from 1 to 782 with an average of 39.
Further, 102 of the signatures appeared every day of the year. Alert volume per day
varied dramatically and ranged from 199,689 to 3,514,819 alerts. The particularly
high volume alert days were due primarily to widespread non-targeted viruses and
worms.
3.4.2 Purpose of the Empirical Analysis
While the data set is rich and unique, it has three key limitations with respect to our
conceptual model in Figure 6. First, we have no measure of the three dimensions of
Target Attractiveness to construct a reliable measure of the construct. For security
and privacy reasons that are common with this type of data, we did not have access to
the client or client information beyond the alert data. Second, we also had no measure
of the level, type and sophistication of countermeasures instituted by the ﬁrm. In
fact, since they were protected by the same MSSP, it is likely that they had similar
countermeasures in place, with little variation across clients. Third, the signature-
based identiﬁcation scheme is not perfect, introducing considerable randomness in
the data. However, the data also has several advantages, the primary being the large
number of records and the panel nature of the data, that allow us to evaluate ﬁrm
and time ﬁxed eﬀect models to control for unobserved heterogeneity both across ﬁrms
and across time. It is an important data source of actual attacks that has not been
adequately exploited in the IS literature.
Thus, while the alert data does not enable us to evaluate some of the propositions
in our conceptual model related to target attractiveness and organizational counter-
measures, it does allow for detailed examination of the key contributions of our model
64Table 14: Correlation between the Main Variables of the Model
Info Scans
(ln)
Attack
Scans
(ln)
Targeted
Probes
(ln)
Info Scans (ln) 1.000
Attack Scans (ln) 0.031 1.000
Targeted Probes (ln) 0.136 0.142 1.000
Targeted Attacks(ln) 0.096 0.186 0.172
through three fundamental research questions. The following questions also summa-
rize the key diﬀerences between the ISCP and the general crime contexts studied in
earlier research.
• Are there distinct opportunistic and deliberate paths to information security
compromise?
• Do these distinct paths converge with the opportunistic path leading to the
deliberate path?
• Does the targeted path progress from information gathering (probes) to targeted
attacks?
In Table 14, we provide the correlations between the main variables in the model.
As noted in the table, the correlations between the variables are low, indicating that
multi-collinearity was not a major issue in the analysis. Further, the variance inﬂation
factors (VIF) in the regression analysis in Table 16 are well below the cut-oﬀ value
of 10.
3.4.3 Opportunistic and Deliberate Paths
Experts from the MSSP independently classiﬁed the signatures into targeted and
non-targeted sub-groups based on the description and detailed technical speciﬁcs.
This classiﬁcation existed in the database independent of our research. Because of
the signature volume, experts classiﬁed only the 2,914 that represented the current,
65frequently occurring signatures. The expert assessments of targeting were “never”,
“sometimes”, “usually”, “always” and “unknown”; for our analysis, we used dichoto-
mous groupings of targeted (including “usually” and “always”) and non-targeted
(“never”) and removed the ambiguous remaining signatures from the sample.
To distinguish between the opportunistic and deliberate paths of attack, we per-
formed three separate analyses on the signatures. First, we looked for signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in attack patterns between the targeted and non-targeted sub-groups us-
ing simple parametric statistical tests. Second, we estimated the well-known Bass
diﬀusion model (Bass, 1969) to identify diﬀerences in diﬀusion patterns between the
two sub-groups as the attempts spread. Third, to understand diﬀerences between the
two sub-groups based on qualitative factors, we utilized several qualitative indicator
variables as predictors in a logit regression with the targeted / non-targeted indicator
as the dependent variable. If the deliberate and opportunistic paths are distinct, we
expect signiﬁcant diﬀerences in attack or diﬀusion patterns between the signature
categories.
Table 15 reveals signiﬁcant and interesting diﬀerences in attack patterns for tar-
geted and non-targeted signatures. As expected, non-targeted signatures generate
signiﬁcantly greater number of alerts per signature (235,524 for each non-targeted
signature compared to 46,772 for each targeted signature). The number of source ad-
dresses for non-targeted attacks is also signiﬁcantly higher (2,291 per non-targeted sig-
nature compared to 281 per targeted signature). On the other hand, targeted attacks
are more thorough, with more alerts generated for each ﬁrm where they are present
and reaching a greater number of destination addresses even though the number of
alerts per signature is less. Thus, non-targeted attacks appear to be broad-brush,
originating from more sources, exhibiting less expertise, and reaching the same lim-
ited set of destination addresses, while targeted attacks are less voluminous, originate
from fewer sources, more thorough and penetrates each ﬁrm more deeply.
66Table 15: Diﬀerences in Attack Patterns between Targeted and Non-targeted Sig-
natures
Per Signature Statistics
No. of
signa-
tures
Alerts Firms af-
fected
(out of
821)
Alerts
per ﬁrm
Source
addresses
Destination
Addresses
Overall 1586 141,266 55 0.272 1,287 847
Targeted 792 46,772 52 0.330 281 1,267
Non-
targeted
794 235,524 59 0.214 2,291 425
Mean Diﬀerence 188,752∗∗ 7∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 2,010∗∗∗ 842
(standard errors) (84,086) (4.83) (0.018) (786) (926)
Alerts per client are calculated for only those clients where a signature is present. Signiﬁcance
based on 2-tailed t-test of diﬀerence in mean. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
∗∗∗(p<0.01), ∗∗(p<0.05), ∗(p<0.1).
To examine diﬀerences in diﬀusion patterns between targeted and non-targeted
signatures, we performed the following analysis. To capture the beginning of the
diﬀusion pattern and reduce truncation problems, we selected only those signatures
that had no alerts for any ﬁrm during the ﬁrst two months of the year 2006. We also
restricted our analysis to only those signatures that reached at least 50% of the clients
in the one-year time period of the analysis, so that our results are not confounded
by the many historical signatures that remain in the MSSP database (signatures are
never removed) but infrequently generate attacks. We then aligned the signatures
based on the ﬁrst date when an alert appeared in our database for each selected
signature and designated that date as day 0. We then calculated the number of new
ﬁrms that each signature aﬀected on subsequent days after day 0, and we estimated
the Bass diﬀusion model (Bass, 1969) with these values. The model we estimate is
f(t)
(1 − F(t))
= p + βp ∗ T + q ∗ F(t) + βq ∗ T ∗ q ∗ F(t) (1)
where f(t) is the rate of change in the fraction of ﬁrms aﬀected at time t, F(t) is the
fraction of ﬁrms aﬀected at time t, p is the coeﬃcient of innovation in the Bass model,
q is the coeﬃcient of imitation in the Bass model, and T is an indicator variable that
is set to 1 for targeted signatures. In our context, p estimates the constant rate of
67p q βp βq
Estimate 0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Standard Error 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.001
R2 = 1%, F = 21.96∗∗∗, N = 7903
Signiﬁcance ∗∗∗(p < 0.01) ∗∗(p < 0.05) ∗(p < 0.1)
Figure 7: Diﬀusion of Attacks for the Targeted and Non-targeted Signatures
change in the fraction of f aﬀected by a signature, while q estimates the eﬀect of
a larger installed base on the rate of change (such as for propagating worms which
spread faster as the aﬀected population increases). The parameters βp and βq estimate
whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the p and q coeﬃcients of the Bass model
for targeted and non-targeted signatures.
Table 15 shows the results of estimating of Equation 1 using OLS estimation
of parameters. The parameter βp is signiﬁcant and negative, indicating that the
p parameter of the Bass diﬀusion model is signiﬁcantly lower (by about 40%) for
targeted attacks when compared to non-targeted attacks. The q parameter for non-
targeted attacks is negative, while the same parameter for targeted attacks (q + βq)
is close to zero, with βq signiﬁcant and positive. The implications of these parameter
estimates are clear in the plot of new ﬁrms (for our set of 821 ﬁrms) aﬀected per day
68for the two types of signatures in Table 15. Non-targeted signatures have higher rates
of diﬀusion in general, but the number of ﬁrms aﬀected per day is high in the ﬁrst
few days and decreases quickly over time. For targeted attacks, the rate is lower but
remains almost constant or only slightly decreasing over time. The low R2 results
from the fact that while the targeted and non-targeted signatures are diﬀerent in
terms of diﬀusion patterns, there is signiﬁcant variation in diﬀusion patterns within
each group, and a more ﬁner-grained analysis of diﬀusion that also considers other
factors remains a future research issue.
Finally, to understand the diﬀerences between the two attack categories based
on qualitative factors, we performed the following analysis. For each signature, we
had access to three qualitative variables: (a) the protocol used by the signature (e.g.
http, sql, ssl, ftp, telnet, etc.), (b) the communication layer exploited (e.g. network,
transport, session, etc.), and (c) the signature type (e.g. virus, worm, trojan horse,
dos command, backdoor, etc.). We created 31 indicator variables to represent the
diﬀerent protocol types, 4 indicator variables to represent the communication layer
exploited, and 17 indicator variables to represent the diﬀerent signature types. We
performed a logit regression with the T variable (T = 1 for targeted, 0 otherwise)
as the dependent variable, and the protocol, communication layer and signature type
indicators as independent variables. The logit regression was highly signiﬁcant (χ2 =
1738.97; pseudo-R2 = 79%). 26 of the 31 protocol indicators were perfect predictors
(belonged completely to either targeted or non-targeted categories) and the remaining
5 were highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) in the logit regression. Likewise, one of the
communication layer indicators was a perfect predictor and two of the remaining
three were highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.05); and 15 of the 17 signature type indicators
were perfect predictors and the remaining two highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) in the
logit regression.
Overall, the empirical analysis in this section provides evidence that targeted and
69non-targeted attacks are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in terms of attack patterns, attack
diﬀusion rates, and several qualitative factors such as the protocol used and commu-
nication layer exploited.
3.4.4 Convergence of Opportunistic and Deliberate Paths
To examine the convergence of the opportunistic and deliberate paths, we built an
unbalanced panel dataset with the number of alerts of each type in the typology
(Figure 5) for each client and for each day in 2006. The targeted / non-targeted clas-
siﬁcation was based on the expert assessments explained earlier. To classify signatures
based on the reconnaissance / attempted compromise dimension (Figure 5), we found
that traﬃc from all signatures is not necessarily stopped by the MSSP; rather, some
signatures can be themselves potentially benign and legitimate, but are still logged
since, combined with other activity, indicate attempts to gain information about the
client systems (Cuppens and Miege, 2002). Therefore, we used the information on
whether or not the alert was ﬁltered to classify the alert as information gathering or
attack. Then, using both the targeted and informational dimensions, we classify each
signature into one of the four categories in the typology (Figure 5). Thus, our unbal-
anced data set contains the number of alerts for each of the four types, for each of
the 821 client ﬁrms, and for each of the 365 days of the year, resulting in over 299,000
observations. To examine the convergence of the opportunistic and deliberate paths
of attack, we evaluate whether information scans lead to targeted probes through the
following ﬁrm and time ﬁxed eﬀects model.
ln(TPit) = β0 + βIS ∗ ln(ISit) + βTP ∗ ln(TPi,t−1) +
X
i
βi ∗ FDi +
X
t
βt ∗ TDt (2)
where TPit is the number of targeted probes for ﬁrm i on day t, ISit is the number
of information scans for ﬁrm i on day t, TPi,t−1 is the lagged dependent variable,
FDi are ﬁrm dummies (820), and TDt are week dummies (51). The model controls
for unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity in the number of attacks through a ﬁxed
70eﬀects model by using the 820 ﬁrm dummies. This controls for factors in the concep-
tual model such as target attractiveness and internet presence that can aﬀect attack
volume. Likewise, we include 51 weekly indicator variables to control for changes in
attack volume over the course of the study year, since we observed signiﬁcant vari-
ability over time in the total volume of attacks. Further, to control for unobserved
events at a ﬁrm that may temporarily drive the number of attacks, we include a
one-day lagged dependent variable in the model. Our primary independent variable
of interest is ln(ISit).
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72Table 16 Panel A shows the results of the analysis using hierarchical regression.
Model A0 includes all the control variables, while Model A1 introduces the ln(ISit)
variable. The coeﬃcient of the ln(ISit) variable is signiﬁcant and positive, indicating
that the number of targeted probes increases with an increase in the number of
information scans. The coeﬃcient of the ln(ISit) variable indicates that about 5% of
the information scans are converted to targeted probes. The models explain about
51% of the variance overall, but as expected, most of the variance is explained through
the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect variables (indicated by the high between-ﬁrms R2). The within-
ﬁrm R2 is of particular interest as it indicates the fraction of within-ﬁrm variance
explained by our models. The week dummies and lagged dependent variable explain
22% of the variance in targeted probes for the same ﬁrm. The introduction of the
ln(ISit) variable increases the within-ﬁrm R2 by approximately 1% to 23%. Even
though only a small percentage (5%) of the information scans lead to targeted probes
based on the estimates, they lead to compromise attempts that are more serious.
Overall, we ﬁnd preliminary evidence that a greater number of information scans
lead to a greater number of targeted probes, after controlling for ﬁrm speciﬁc and
time speciﬁc factors.
3.4.5 Progression from Information Gathering to Attack
To examine the progression of activity from information gathering to attack in the
conceptual model in Figure 6, we test for the mediating eﬀect of targeted probes be-
tween non-targeted information scans and targeted attacks Baron and Kenny (1986).
Speciﬁcally, we evaluate the following two models.
ln(TAit) = β0 + βIS ∗ ln(ISit) + βTA ∗ ln(TAi,t−1) +
X
i
βi ∗ FDi +
X
t
βt ∗ TDt (3)
ln(TAit) = β0+βIS∗ln(ISit)+βTP∗ln(TPit)+βTA∗ln(TAi,t−1)+
X
i
βi ∗ FDi+
X
t
βt ∗ TDt
(4)
73where TAit is the number of targeted attacks for ﬁrm i on day t, TAi,t−1 is the
corresponding lagged variable, and the other variables are as explained in the previous
section.
Table 16 Panel B shows the results of OLS estimation of the parameters. Model B0
in is a control model for targeted attacks with all variables highly signiﬁcant. In Model
B1, we test the impact of non-targeted information scans on targeted attacks and ﬁnd
the coeﬃcient to be highly signiﬁcant. Model B2 introduces ln(TPit) variable and ﬁnd
the coeﬃcient to be highly signiﬁcant also. Although the coeﬃcient for ln(ISit) remain
signiﬁcant in model B2, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is reduced (from 0.087 to
0.067) after the introduction of the ln(TPit) variable, indicating partial mediation
(Baron and Kenny, 1986). Further, we use the Sobel test (Baron and Kenny, 1986;
Sobel, 1982) and ﬁnd the results to be highly statistically signiﬁcant (T = 38.90,
p < 0.001), indicating the mediating role of the ln(TPit) variable. The within-ﬁrm R2
increases from 23.9%to 25.1% in Model B2. Overall, our results provide preliminary
evidence of progression from information gathering to attacks.
3.4.6 Additional Analysis with Alert Data
In addition to the empirical analysis described above, we performed two additional
analyses using the alert data. First, as additional empirical support for the conceptual
model, we demonstrate that larger passive Internet presence (measured by the number
of reachable IP addresses) has a positive eﬀect on the number of information scans
and targeted probes. Second, for robustness, we considered the source IP address
in the analysis of convergence and progression of attacks. Speciﬁcally, we segregate
attacks to a target ﬁrm by their source IP address, thereby following attacks from
the same source to the same destination, and we demonstrate similar results.
743.4.6.1 The Eﬀect of Passive Internet Presence
The conceptual model hypothesizes that the eﬀect of passive Internet presence on
Targeted Probes is not direct; instead, the eﬀect is mediated by Information Scans
(Proposition 2 and Proposition 4). We are constrained by the information we have
on each target ﬁrm; however, we can estimate the total number of distinct Internet
addresses that are associated with the target ﬁrm by counting the distinct destination
IP addresses of alerts generated for a target ﬁrm during the entire year. The number
of IP addresses is one measure of the passive Internet presence of the target ﬁrm. We
use this metric to provide support for Proposition 2B and Proposition 4.
First, we investigated the eﬀect of passive Internet presence on Information Scans.
The coeﬃcient for the number of IP addresses in Model C (Table 17) with Informa-
tion Scans as the dependent variable is positive and signiﬁcant (p < 0.01). Thus,
consistent with Proposition 2B, we ﬁnd that the Passive Internet Presence of a tar-
get ﬁrm positively aﬀects the number of Information Scans. Second, we investigated
the mediating role of Information Scans on the relationship between passive Internet
presence and Targeted Probes. Model D in Table 17 shows that the coeﬃcient for
IP addresses in the regression reduces from 1.98x10−6 to 1.65x10−6 after the intro-
duction of Information Scans. The coeﬃcient for Information Scans is positive and
signiﬁcant (p < 0.01). Further, a Sobel test supports the mediating role of Informa-
tion Scans in the relationship between passive Internet presence and Targeted Probes
(t = 17.118, p < 0.01). Because the number of IP addresses does not vary across
time for the same ﬁrm, we are unable to include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the models in
Table 17. However, a lagged dependent variable is included to partially account for
ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics.
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763.4.6.2 Analysis with Source IP Address
In the empirical analysis of convergence and progression of attack paths in the paper,
we pooled all alerts for a given date so that the unit of analysis was the target ﬁrm
and date set. That is, for each target ﬁrm and date, we calculated the volume of
attacks for each of the four categories. For robustness, we repeated the same analysis
after segregating the attacks for each target ﬁrm based on the source IP address. In
this analysis, the unit of analysis is the target ﬁrm, date, and source IP addresses set.
That is, for each target ﬁrm, source IP address and date combination, we calculated
the volume of attacks for each of the four categories, and repeated the regressions.
Thus, in this analysis, we eﬀectively follow attacks from the same IP source to a
speciﬁc target ﬁrm, to look for evidence of convergence and progression. Within
this dataset, there are 8,024,697 distinct records for target ﬁrm, date, and source IP
address combination. However, the dataset was extremely sparse since most source IP
addresses generated attacks on a single date for a speciﬁc target, and never appeared
again. To keep the problem tractable, we included the 10 source IP addresses for
each target ﬁrm that generated the highest number of attacks during the entire year.
Of course, the set of top 10 source IP addresses may be diﬀerent for each client.
It is important to note that the results of this analysis should be interpreted
with caution because source IP addresses are inherently unreliable. There are four
reasons that a single attacking entity could have diﬀerent source IP addresses while
following the conceptual model of the information security compromise process. First,
many of the higher volume alerts may be generated by zombies or botnets where an
attacker uses multiple comprised computers to perform the early stages of the attack
process (information search), then uses a diﬀerent single machine for more targeted
attacks. Second, attackers can be expected to change source IP addresses to reduce
the likelihood of detection. Third, we expect that organized groups of attackers
have division of responsibility where less experienced attackers channel information
77gathered to more experienced attackers. Finally, given the criminal nature of the
activities, attackers mask their actual source IP address to reduce the possibility of
detection. Given these limitations, any empirical support found is a conservative
estimate of the real eﬀects.
Table 18 summarizes the results of the analysis. We ﬁnd continued support for
the convergence of paths with the information scans coeﬃcient signiﬁcant (p < 0.01)
and indicating that 2% of the information scans are converted to targeted probes.
However, support for the progression of attacks is less clear. The introduction of
targeted probes as a mediator of the relationship between information scans and
targeted attacks does not signiﬁcantly reduce the coeﬃcient on information scans,
but the coeﬃcient on the targeted probes variable is positive and signiﬁcant. The
associated Sobel test for mediation ﬁnds only weak indication (t = 1.41, p < 0.160) of
any mediating role. In summary, when considering the source IP address of the alert,
we ﬁnd continued support for convergence, but weak evidence of progression. Since
source IP addresses are inherently unreliable, the results represent a lower bound on
the support for progression.
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793.5 Summary, Discussion And Conclusions
In this research, we develop a conceptual model of the ISCP through a grounded
approach that depicts two separate attack paths, deliberate and opportunistic, that
merge as antecedents to information security compromise. The model also recog-
nizes the moderating (rather than direct) role of organizational countermeasures in
reducing the progression of attacks and its ultimate conversion to information secu-
rity compromise. Our empirical results validate the existence of the two paths, the
merging of the paths from opportunistic to deliberate, and the progression of attacks
from informational to compromise attempts.
3.5.1 Limitations
We identify several limitations of the study. First, while care was taken to diﬀerentiate
alerts along the targeted/non-targeted dimension and the empirical analysis demon-
strated signiﬁcant diﬀerences, there remains ambiguity in classiﬁcation since we have
created dichotomous variables from underlying continuous classiﬁcations. Second,
while we recognize that our study context is dynamic because signatures can evolve
from targeted to non-targeted as they are packaged into tools, we are not able to
observe this temporal dimension in our secondary data. Third, the alert data we use
in the empirical analysis is inherently noisy because the signature based identiﬁcation
scheme is imperfect and there is distinct randomness in the data. Fourth, we have
used imprecise measures for each of the constructs in our conceptual model based on
the data that was available to us. Finally, while we provide empirical support for the
key contributions of our conceptual model, portions of the model related to target
attractiveness and countermeasures remain untested in our analysis.
3.5.2 Managerial Implications
From a practical perspective, our results highlight four messages for managers. First,
while it may have been previously safe to assume that an organization not intrinsically
80attractive to attackers was immune from attacks, the opportunistic path illustrates
that all systems are potential victims. We see a high volume of non-targeted attacks
(98% of all attacks) across all targets, irrespective of target attributes. While these
attacks are indiscriminate, broad-brush, and often require less expertise, the conver-
gence of attack paths imply that many of these opportunistic attacks will become
more serious targeted compromise attempts.
Second, we ﬁnd evidence of progression of attacks from simple information scans to
serious targeted attacks. Organizational countermeasures halt the progression of an
incident by reducing the number of information scans converted to targeted probes,
and the number of targeted probes converted to targeted attacks. Thus, eﬀective
vulnerability control and feature control countermeasures (e.g. patching, virus pro-
tection, disabling insecure protocols) that halt the progression of attacks at an early
stage are important, since later stage countermeasures such as traﬃc ﬁltering are
often imprecise and imperfect (Cavusoglu et al., 2005b).
Third, active presence on the Internet leads to more attacks through the targeted
path. While reducing active presence may be contrary to business goals, managers
should consider its eﬀects on information security. Similarly, reducing the dimensions
of target attractiveness, such as shrinking the customer base or reducing visibility,
may be infeasible or undesirable, leading to the reality of residual risk.
Finally, the conceptual model presented in Figure 6 can be used as an eﬀective
teaching tool to educate managers and students about IS security. It provides a com-
prehensive, cogent and non-technical model to understand the information security
compromise process from the perspective of a target organization.
3.5.3 Implications for Research
Several areas of future research emerge from the conceptual model and empirical
analysis.
813.5.3.1 Measurement Instruments
The development of measurement instruments that accurately capture each construct
(organizational countermeasures, attractiveness and presence) is a research topic in
itself. While we have identiﬁed the dimensions of each construct, we have not focused
on measurement issues. As is common with secondary data analysis, we are limited
to proxies that can be measured through the available data. However, development
of detailed measurement instruments will have several beneﬁts. It will help managers
accurately measure various aspects of their information security environment. The
measurement instrument can also serve as a theory-driven audit and benchmarking
tool.
3.5.3.2 Empirical Validation
Siponen (2005) points to the paucity of empirical research in this area. One area of
empirical research that is likely to be of signiﬁcant practical signiﬁcance is the eﬃ-
cacy of diﬀerent organizational countermeasures in the two attack paths, deliberate
and opportunistic. Speciﬁcally, evaluating the trade-oﬀ between early and later stage
countermeasures, balancing the ability of countermeasures to halt the progression
of an attack versus the negative consequences of reduced access, and measuring the
false positives and false negatives of later stage countermeasures are important topics.
Empirical validation is also important to establish the antecedents of each path in the
conceptual model (target attractiveness, active and passive presence), so that man-
agers can better control or at least consider these antecedents during IS and business
planning. Further, we have attempted a partial validation of the conceptual model
and a more complete empirical validation remains a future research opportunity.
3.5.3.3 Finer-Grained Analysis of Alert Data
Alert data is voluminous, complex and extraordinarily diﬃcult to synthesize. We have
attempted a broad analysis of the alert data in this research, but there is signiﬁcant
82scope for ﬁner grained analysis of this important data source. Four types of analysis
are possible, among others: (a) discovery of attack patterns associated with various
types of attacks, (b) analysis of the impact of speciﬁc countermeasures, (c) discovery
of changing attack characteristics and trends over time, and (d) examination of the
impact of security relevant events (such as the release of a vulnerability or patch) on
attack volume. While the computer science community has focused on methods to
aggregate alert data and to identify attacks in progress (Cuppens and Miege, 2002),
there is signiﬁcant scope for analysis from organizational and policy perspectives.
3.5.3.4 Theoretical Extensions
Two fundamental theoretical extensions are possible. First, future research can fo-
cus on the antecedents and consequents of the constructs identiﬁed in this research.
Within this theme, four topics emerge that will be of signiﬁcant practical relevance—
(a) What managerial, organizational and environmental factors lead to better organi-
zational countermeasures? (b) What managerial actions reduce the three dimensions
of perceived attractiveness? (c) What are the business consequences of IS security
compromise? and (d) What can managers do to reduce passive and active Internet
presence and their impact? Second, future research can also modify the proposed
relationships and dimensions, and identify additional constructs beyond those in Fig-
ure 6. For example, research can start with an alternative categorization of attacks
and generate diﬀerent constructs that aﬀect such categories. Alternatively, research
could identify additional constructs that aﬀect the attack categories described in this
paper.
3.5.4 Concluding Discussion
The conceptual model and empirical analysis highlights three key diﬀerences between
the ISCP and general crime contexts examined in the literature. First, the existence
of two separate paths of attack and the importance of the opportunistic path are
83distinctive characteristics of the ISCP. The proliferation of tools and the lack of en-
forcement have created a unique environment where the cost of attack is negligible
and the expertise required to exploit vulnerabilities is low, resulting in the oppor-
tunistic path being dominant in terms of attack volume. The antecedents of the two
attack paths are also distinct. In the opportunistic path, mere presence drives attacks
and ﬁrms can do little to control the antecedents. For the deliberate path, there are
two antecedents—one which is intrinsic to the ﬁrm (target attractiveness) and the
other which the ﬁrm can partially control (active presence). Second, the opportunis-
tic path leads to the targeted path, creating a new way of searching for targets that
is often independent of target attractiveness or its active presence. In this method,
attackers ﬁnd targets by chance and then follow a more deliberate approach. Third,
the progression of attacks from information gathering to compromise attempts is also
a distinctive feature of the ISCP that has some parallels in the crime literature on
repeat victimization (Bowling, 1993; McShane and Williams, 1997). However, in the
ISCP context, the initial attempts fall within the boundaries of legitimate activity
that cannot often be stopped by the target organization without hindering other crit-
ical activities. If there are weaknesses in countermeasures, then such holes will be
discovered and exploited.
Finally, while we did not empirically investigate the issue in this paper, the con-
ceptual model highlights a moderating rather than a direct role for organizational
countermeasures in the ISCP. This distinction is subtle but important. The rational
choice models of crime (Ehrlich, 1996) indicate that higher levels of deterrence leads
to lower levels of crime in general. In the Internet environment, the low cost of attack-
ing systems creates an environment where countermeasures do not necessarily reduce
attack volume, but reduces the progression of attacks from information gathering to
compromise attempts, and subsequently to information security compromise.
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ARE REWARD-BASED DISCLOSURE MECHANISMS
EFFECTIVE?
4.1 Introduction
The unfortunate reality of widespread security vulnerabilities in technology products
is an important topic not only to security and information systems professionals but
also to consumers, business and policy makers. While business commerce depends
on information systems, security vulnerabilities pose ever-present risks which are no
longer isolated to technical staﬀ. In fact, policy decisions are increasing important
as “incentives are becoming as important as technical design” (Anderson and Moore,
2006, p. 610). Much of the incentive debate has focused on the discovery and dis-
closure of vulnerabilities and the associated incentives for provision of research eﬀort
towards discovery.
Historically the security community relied on the others in the community to
disclose vulnerabilities when found. In this sense, vulnerability research can be con-
sidered a public good– consumption of security information does not preclude others
from using the information as well. Like other public goods, without additional incen-
tives, security will be insuﬃciently provided (Garcia and Horowitz, 2007). Therefore,
vulnerability markets have been proposed to encourage researchers to provide this
public good (Schechter, 2004). Several private vulnerability markets are currently in
existence, including iDefense and the Zero Day Initiative. Figure 8 depicts the overall
vulnerability disclosures by both reward-based and non-reward-based mechanisms for
each quarter since 2000. While reward-based disclosures remain a small fraction of
the total disclosures, the vulnerability markets are being used.
85Figure 8: Vulnerability Reports by Quarter
Despite their use, the impact of these reward-based mechanisms is far from clear.
While reward mechanisms create incentives for research and discovery, they have
some limitations. Because the private vulnerability markets focus on their own proﬁt
maximizing strategy, they have an incentive to leak vulnerability information and
therefore decrease social welfare (Kannan and Telang, 2005). Rather than having the
desired eﬀect of increasing security, they may instead be contributing to an overall
decrease in security.
Thus, the fundamental question remains open— “are reward-based disclosure
mechanisms for vulnerabilities eﬀective?” My research addresses this question through
a large scale empirical study of vulnerabilities disclosed through both reward-based
and non-reward-based mechanisms. To gauge eﬀectiveness, I examine three measures
of eﬀectiveness.
Risk Does reward-based disclosure aﬀect the likelihood of a vulnerability being ex-
ploited?
86Speed Does reward-based disclosure aﬀect the speed of exploitation of a vulnerabil-
ity?
Volume Does reward-based disclosure aﬀect the volume of attacks based on the
vulnerability?
Through the empirical study of more than 2.4 billion billion alerts generated by
intrusion detection systems from 2006 and 2007, I provide evidence that vulnerabil-
ity markets using reward-based mechanisms are eﬀective.1 First, while the overall
exploitation of vulnerabilities is the same for reward-based and non-reward-based
mechanisms, reward-based disclosures decrease the likelihood that the vulnerability
will be exploited quickly. This allows more time for the security community to defend
against the exploit through patching or developing countermeasures. Second, I ﬁnd
that reward-based disclosure reduces the volume of alerts resulting from a vulnera-
bility.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides background
on the vulnerability disclosure environment. Section 4.3 reviews the recent literature
regarding vulnerability disclosure in general and vulnerability market formation in
particular. Section 4.4 describes the data and methods used to evaluate reward-
based disclosure eﬀectiveness. Section 4.5 examines the factors leading to selection of
disclosure through reward-based or non-reward-based channels. Section 4.6 discusses
the results of the empirical analysis of the eﬀectiveness of the existing vulnerability
markets. Section 4.7 provides a summary of the key ﬁndings along with guidance for
future research.
1I would like to thank SecureWorks, Inc., and Jon Ramsey, Chief Technology Oﬃcer, for their
assistance with this research by providing expert consultation, detailed explanation of their exten-
sive Security Operations Centers, and thorough grounding in the reality of the current security
environment. I am especially appreciative that they made a summarized abstract of their database
of security alert data available to me. The views expressed in this thesis are my own. Any errors
remain the responsibility of the author.
87Figure 9: Discovery of Vulnerabilities
4.2 Disclosure Environment
Vulnerabilities exist in all systems whether they are known or unknown. Of the un-
known vulnerabilities, there are two methods that a vulnerability can be discovered—
labeled malevolent and benign. The deﬁning distinction between the malevolent re-
searcher and the benign researcher is the researcher action upon discovery of the
vulnerability. Figure 9 depicts the relationships between the sets of vulnerabilities.
First, a vulnerability can be found by a malevolent researcher. This researcher is
rewarded through exploiting the vulnerability (or, alternatively, selling the vulnera-
bility to others who will exploit the vulnerability.) The total value of this reward is
the expected value of the sum of the successful exploitations of the vulnerability. In
the case of malevolent discovery, the discover beneﬁts most if the vulnerability is kept
secret and also is not discovered by a benign researcher. Second, a vulnerability can
be found by a benign researcher. With vulnerability markets, the researcher is paid
a reward by the market for their eﬀort. (Without the vulnerability market, there is
no monetary reward.)
These methods work independently, but are related. Benign researchers can ﬁnd
vulnerabilities that malevolent researchers have not found. However, to be useful
88for protection, a benign discoverer must make use of the vulnerability information.
Leakage occurs when malevolent researchers learn of the vulnerability as a result o
fthe benign discovery. This leakage may be intentional, as private markets have in-
centives to leak information and increase the value of their services (Kannan and
Telang, 2005), or it may occur inadvertently through reverse engineering of protec-
tion systems. Similarly, malevolent researchers may ﬁnd vulnerabilities that benign
researchers have not already found. In parallel to leakage of benign ﬁndings, the
malevolent researcher must use the vulnerability to realize value. Usage of the vul-
nerability in an exploit may increase the likelihood of benign discovery.
4.3 Literature Review
Research is active in understanding the underlying economics of information security.
Earlier work focused on topics such as risk management (Straub and Welke, 1998),
and handling abuse (Straub and Nance, 1990). More recently, Anderson and Moore
(2006) and Gordon and Loeb (2006) provide overviews of the key complexities sur-
rounding the misaligned incentives, negative externalities, and general challenges for
information systems professionals. Patching issues such as user incentives (August
and Tunca, 2006), restricted distribution (Rahman et al., 2006), and piracy (August
and Tunca, 2008) have been of recent research interest.
Recognizing that vulnerabilities are inevitable, research surrounding disclosure of
vulnerabilities has been particularly active. While disclosure announcements can af-
fect the value of software vendor (Telang and Wattal, 2005), public disclosure can,
under some conditions, promote social welfare (Nizovtsev and Thursby, 2007). Fur-
ther, disclosure itself has several options, each of which has their own strengths and
weakness (Arora et al., 2004b), particularly regarding the pressure that disclosure
places on vendors. Vendors have been shown empirically to respond to disclosure
(Arora et al., 2005) especially under certain competitive conditions (Arora et al.,
892006a). Disclosure and patching has also been found to aﬀect the volume of attacks
seen in controlled research networks called honeypots (Arora et al., 2006b, 2004a).
However, while there is great value in the controlled environment that honeypots
provide, my research is among the ﬁrst empirical analysis using real, multi-ﬁrm alert
data.
A signiﬁcant issue in information systems security is the incentives for investment.
Research has shown that security can be considered a public good and tends to be
under-provisioned (Garcia and Horowitz, 2007). Investment in IT security deterrence
has been shown to be eﬀective within a ﬁrm (Straub, 1990). However, because of
externalities, under-investment is likely. Regulation has been suggested to improve
social welfare but faces signiﬁcant challenges (Garcia and Horowitz, 2007).
As an alternative, reward-based mechanisms have been proposed to address the
under-investment. Speciﬁcally, rather than depending on the security community to
freely contribute vulnerability research, payments can be used to encourage research
(Schechter, 2004). This approach recognizes the reward structure for vulnerabilities
available in the black market (Radianti and Gonzalez, 2007) and seeks to oﬀset it.
These markets for vulnerabilities have been suggested as an interesting economic
model for exploration (Sutton and Nagel, 2006; Anderson and Moore, 2006). In
addition to straight payment structures, auctions have been proposed but they, along
with reward mechanisms, have implementation diﬃculties (Ozment, 2004). In fact,
a recent vulnerability auction has been implemented (WabiSabiLabi). Yet, interest
in reward-based mechanisms remains the most active with two vulnerability markets
(iDefense and the Zero Day Initiative) in active use over the past couple of years.
Unfortunately, the impact of such reward-based mechanisms is not clear. The
presence of private infomediaries introduces additional complexity to the disclosure
and patch cycle (Li and Rao, 2007). A speciﬁc concern is that private infomediaries
have an incentive to leak information. In an analytical model, Kannan and Telang
90(2005) have shown that private infomediaries can actually reduce social welfare due
to information leakage rather than increase welfare through incentives. Further, the
information leak does not have to be intentional by the private infomediaries. Instead,
by reverse engineering signatures on intrusion detection systems, ﬁrms providing pro-
tection to their clients can inadvertently disclose vulnerabilities to potential attack-
ers. Adding further complexity, Kumar et al. (2007) ﬁnd diﬀerential eﬀects from
diﬀerent types of information leaks such as vulnerabilities which reveal conﬁdential
information. In an abstract sense, much like there are concerns that weapon buy-
back programs may actually increase the number of guns (Mullin, 2001), vulnerability
purchase programs may increase the number of vulnerabilities.
Overall, the eﬀects of reward-based private infomediaries are ambiguous as in-
creased incentives may be oﬀset by information leakage. To examine the eﬀectiveness
of reward-based disclosures for vulnerabilities, I consider three possibilities.
• Does disclosure through a reward-based mechanism aﬀect the likelihood of a
vulnerability being exploited?
• Does disclosure through a reward-based mechanism aﬀect the speed by which
a vulnerability is exploited?
• Does disclosure through a reward-based mechanism aﬀect the volume of alerts
seen by from a vulnerability?
First, not all vulnerabilities disclosed are exploited. Attackers may ﬁnd some
vulnerabilities more attractive or more rewarding than others. One measure of eﬀec-
tiveness of a reward-based mechanism would be if vulnerabilities disclosed through
the mechanism were more or less likely to be exploited. Based on the preceding
concerns about leakage of information from private infomediaries, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 Disclosure through reward-based mechanisms will increase the likeli-
hood that a vulnerability will be exploited.
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nign researchers, a competing hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2 Disclosure through reward-based mechanisms will decrease the likeli-
hood that a vulnerability will be exploited.
Second, the discovery mechanisms of reward-based private infomediaries get infor-
mation to the defenders more quickly, increasing the time available for the deployment
of countermeasures. Accordingly, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3 Disclosure through reward-based mechanisms will decrease the likeli-
hood that a vulnerability will be seen soon after the vulnerability is published.
Third, the discovery of vulnerabilities through reward-based private informediaries
may decrease the usage of the vulnerability by attackers by the preceding reasoning.
Therefore, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4 Disclosure through reward-based mechanisms will decrease the num-
ber of alerts that are seen for a vulnerability.
4.4 Data and Methodology
4.4.1 Data
To investigate the eﬀectiveness of reward-based mechanisms, my primary datasource
is a summarized database of alerts generated from intrusion detection systems. An
intrusion detection system (IDS) is installed to protect a network by ﬁltering bad or
potentially bad traﬃc from getting into the network. One way that an IDS works is
by looking for sequences of data in a packet that match a known sequence associated
with a vulnerability. These known sequences are called signatures. (The basic role
and function of intrusion detection systems are described in more detail in Chapter 3.)
Each time a signature is seen, an alert is generated and saved for further analysis.
92The alert database is provided by SecureWorks, a managed security service provider.
The dataset provides a unique forum for research analysis both because it contains
real alert data (as opposed to data from a research setting) and because the data
is from several thousand clients across many industries. These characteristics allow
me to examine the actual eﬀectiveness of markets using real data that is not speciﬁc
to any single client. The following analysis is based on a summarized set of alerts
covering 2006 and 2007.
The key variable of interest is whether or not a vulnerability was disclosed through
a reward-based mechanism (market) or through a non-reward-based mechanism. Dur-
ing 2006 and 2007, there were two vulnerability markets providing incentives for re-
searchers to discover and disclose vulnerabilities through their service (iDefense and
the Zero Day Initiative). During that same period, there were many other options
which did not reward researchers directly. The most common of these are CERT,
Security Focus, XForce, Secunia, Bugtraq and Internet Security Systems X-Force. I
include an indicator variable if a vulnerability was disclosed through one of the two
reward-based mechanisms.
4.4.2 Control Variables
I match the signatures for a vulnerability with the detailed information available
primarily through the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD, 2008). Each vulner-
ability in the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) is assessed using a Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Through this uniform scoring, I am able to
control for speciﬁc attributes of the vulnerability. Details on version 2 of the scoring
system are in Mell and Romanosky (2008). From the scoring, I include the following:
Access Required This metric describes the proximity required to exploit the vul-
nerability. Proximities are scored as local if the attacker must have local access
to the potential target, adjacent if attacker must be closely located or remote
93if the attacker can be across a non-local network.
Complexity Once the attacker has access, vulnerabilities have varying degrees of
complexity to exploit and are categorized as low, medium, or high complexity.
Authentication Required Some vulnerabilities may be exploited anonymously;
others require authentication. I include an indicator if the attacker must pass
some authentication step to exploit the vulnerability. While the CVSS indicates
the number of authentications required (either None, Single, or Multiple), I use
an indicator variable Authentication Required if any authentication is required
due to a low number of multiple authentication vulnerabilities reported.
Impact The potential impact of a vulnerability is categorized as aﬀecting the dis-
closure of conﬁdential information (Conﬁdentiality), the integrity of data (In-
tegrity) or the availability of system resources (Availability). For each of these,
the CVSS reports impacts of None, Partial, or Complete. However, for my
analysis I use an indicator variable for each category if the impact is present.
(There are few partial impact vulnerabilities.)
Beyond the scoring, there are other aspects of the vulnerability for which I am able
to control. First, the NVD includes seven diﬀerent types of vulnerabilities. They are
incorrect allowance of privileges (Access Validation), failure to handle incorrect input
(Input Validation), shortcomings in design of software (Design Error), insuﬃcient
response to unexpected conditions (Exception Error), weak conﬁguration of settings
(Conﬁguration Error), errors due to sequencing of events (Race Condition), or un-
categorized (Other). Indicator variables are included for these categories. Second, I
include an indicator variable, Patch Available, if a patch was available at the time
that the vulnerability was disclosure. Next, I include an indicator variable, Signature
Available, if a signature was available at the time that the vulnerability was disclosed.
Further, I also include the age of vulnerability measured as the number of days since
94the vulnerability was disclosed. Finally, in several of the following analyses, I am also
able to control for changes in trends over time using ﬁxed eﬀects.
4.4.3 Methodology
First, in my sample of 1252 vulnerabilities for which we had full data with alert sig-
natures matched into the NVD database, only 153 (12%) were exploited by attackers.
To examine the diﬀerence that reward-based mechanism disclosure makes in the like-
lihood of exploitation, I use the logit regression, ln

ei
1−ei

= βxi + βmarketxmarket,i.
The variable ei takes the value of 1 when an exploit of vulnerability i is observed.
Vector β is the control variables listed in Section 4.4.2 and variable xmarket,i is 1 if the
reward-based mechanism for disclosure was used. Further, because of the potential
for censoring caused by the end of the study, I use a Cox proportional hazard model
(Cox, 1972) to provide further support. In the proportional hazard model, the risk
of failure (exploitation of a vulnerability) at time t for vulnerability i is given by
λ(t) = λ0(ti)e(−xiβ). These analyses allow an empirical answer to the competing hy-
potheses that reward-based either increase or decrease the likelihood of exploitation
of a vulnerability (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2).
Second, I use another logit model to examine the risk of exploitation shortly after
the vulnerability is published. The risk of exploitation in the prior analysis only
evaluated the risk of exploitation during the entire study period. For comparison, I
use similar logit regression to determine the risk of exploitation within one month and
one week of disclosure. This analysis allows an empirical answer to the hypothesis
that reward-based disclosures decrease the likelihood that an exploit will be seen soon
after disclosure (Hypothesis 3).
Third, I built a panel dataset which contains the daily count of alerts for each
type of vulnerability for the period from 2006 to 2007. I use a random eﬀects panel
regression to estimate the impact of market disclosure on the natural log of the
95number of alerts, ai,t for vulnerability i. The model estimated is ln(ai,t) = xi,tβ +
alphai + ui,t where xi,t is the vector of independent and control variables, alphai are
the random eﬀects, and ui,t is the error term. This analysis allows an empirical answer
to the hypothesis that reward-based disclosures decrease the overall volume of alerts
generated (Hypothesis 4).
4.5 Selection of Disclosure to Reward-Based or Non-Reward-
Based
Before examining the eﬀectiveness of the reward-based mechanisms, I ﬁrst compare
the vulnerabilities disclosed through the two mechanisms. For this comparison, I
use the entire set of vulnerabilities contained in the NVD. While there are several
repositories of vulnerability information, the NVD contains a large cross sections of
vulnerabilities consistently reported. Similar large scale analysis have been done of
vulnerabilities (Frei et al., 2006), but have not focused on the selection of disclosure
mechanism. During 2006 and 2007, the NVD published information about 13,249
vulnerabilities. Of these, 345 (2.6%) were initially reported by one of the two vulner-
ability reward-based mechanisms. Table 19 shows descriptive statistics about all of
the vulnerabilities disclosed during 2006 and 2007.
I use a logit model to analyze the selection of disclosure through the reward-
based or non-reward-based mechanism. Table 20 shows the inﬂuence of vulnerability
attributes on the likelihood of being disclosed through a reward-based mechanism ver-
sus a non-reward-based mechanism. The logit analysis indicates that vulnerabilities
which only require network access are associated with non-reward-based disclosure.
Similarly, vulnerabilities based on access violation, input validation errors, and design
omissions are also associated with non-reward-based disclosure. Conversely, reward-
based disclosures are associated vulnerabilities of medium complexity or which im-
pact system conﬁdence or availability. Overall, the analysis suggests that there are
distinct associations between some vulnerability attributes and resultant disclosure
96Table 19: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Percentage Count
Total 100.00% 13,249
Reward-Based 2.60% 345
Non-Reward-Based 97.40% 12,904
Access Requires Local 9.53% 1,262
Requires Adjacent 0.44% 58
Network 90.04% 11,929
Complexity Low 62.84% 8,326
Medium 29.41% 3,897
High 7.74% 1,026
Authentication Not required 93.52% 12,391
Required 6.48% 858
Conﬁdentiality Impact No 28.30% 3,750
Yes 71.70% 9,499
Integrity Impact No 21.40% 2,835
Yes 78.60% 10,414
Availability Impact No 28.40% 3,763
Yes 71.60% 9,486
Vulnerability Access 4.95% 656
Input 51.13% 6,774
Design 11.85% 1,570
Exception 5.35% 709
Environmental 0.24% 32
Conﬁguration 0.87% 115
Race Condition 0.62% 82
Other 1.05% 139
Contains Signature No 97.28% 12,888
Yes 2.72% 361
Patch Available No 66.89% 8,862
Yes 33.11% 4,387
97mechanism.
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99Table 21 shows a similar analysis to Table 20, but examines changes in attribute
inﬂuence through 2006 to 2007. Based on the logit analysis, none of the explanatory
variables shift their inﬂuence from reward-based to non-reward-based during the time
period. However, the magnitude of some of the coeﬃcients changes signiﬁcantly. For
example, while vulnerabilities which require only network access (instead of local
access) to exploit are consistently more often reported through non-reward-based
mechanisms, their association with non-reward-based disclosure increases in strength
during the period of the study. Also, which input validation based vulnerabilities are
initially strongly associated with non-reward-based disclosure in early 2006, by the
end of 2007, they are as likely to be disclosed though one mechanism as the other.
Overall, this suggests there are some minor changes in the attributes of vulnerabilities
which are being disclosed through each type of mechanism.
4.6 Empirical Examination of Reward-based Disclosure Ef-
fectiveness
First, I examine how reward-based or non-reward-based disclosure aﬀects the risk
of the vulnerability being exploited. The logit regressions in Model 1 and Model
2 (Table 22) indicate that disclosure through a reward-based mechanism does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited. Interestingly,
medium complexity vulnerabilities are less likely to be exploited than low complex-
ity, but high complexity are not. Attackers also appear to be more likely to exploit
vulnerabilities impacting system integrity. As expected, the availability of patches
reduces the likelihood of exploit as attacker may feel that their chances of success
are diminished. The availability of a signature increases the likelihood of exploita-
tion providing some evidence that attackers gain information about how to exploit a
vulnerability by examining a signature. Because the sample is censored at the end of
2007, a similar analysis was done using a proportional hazard model (Table 23). In
100Table 21: Selection of Reward-based or Non-Reward-based Disclosure Over Time
Variable Jan-Jun
2006
Jul-Dec
2006
Jan-Jun
2007
Jul-Dec
2007
Constant -4.9775∗∗∗
(0.9244)
-3.9975∗∗∗
(0.6021)
-3.3216∗∗∗
(0.5055)
-3.9254∗∗∗
(0.4265)
Access: Adjacent —- — 0.9347
(0.6304)
-0.0201
(1.1797)
Access: Network -0.7876∗
(0.4640)
-0.6035∗
(0.3343)
-0.3068
(0.2776)
-1.4280∗∗∗
(0.2437)
Complexity: Medium 1.2863
(0.8560)
0.3036
(0.3605)
0.2694
(0.1947)
0.3071
(0.2115)
Complexity: High 0.1003
(0.5322)
0.1407
(0.3743)
0.0909
(0.4728)
0.0458
(0.6339)
Authentication -0.2378
(0.8243)
0.4300
(0.3512)
-0.4736
(0.3586)
-0.7969∗
(0.4677)
Conﬁdence Impact 1.0001
(0.8318)
0.4754
(0.4759)
0.2709
(0.3581)
1.0937∗∗∗
(0.3482)
Integrity Impact 0.1989
(0.8843)
-0.2622
(0.4731)
0.4775
(0.3766)
0.5036
(0.3699)
Availability Impact 1.3898∗
(0.7941)
1.2638∗∗∗
(0.4660)
0.5847∗
(0.3453)
0.6368∗
(0.3579)
Vuln: Access -1.2168
(0.9957)
-0.9925
(0.7308)
-0.3530
(0.3133)
-0.4414
(0.7252)
Vuln: Input Validation -2.7317∗∗∗
(0.7664)
-1.3152∗∗
(0.3198)
-2.0968∗∗
(0.2775)
-0.4571
(0.3176)
Vuln: Design -1.3637∗∗
(0.6355)
-0.1658
(0.3873)
-0.7064∗∗
(0.2972)
0.0125
(0.4022)
Vuln: Exception -0.0785
(0.6864)
0.3863
(0.3977)
0.0828
(0.3115)
0.3608
(0.6182)
Vuln: Race 0.4436
(1.1025)
— 0.3627
(0.6664)
0.1672
(0.7678)
Vuln: Other — 0.5145
(1.1557)
— 0.2072
(0.6116)
Vuln: Conﬁg — — -0.5226
(1.0262)
-0.2785
(1.2070)
Observations 3112 3381 3574 2980
Log likelihood -139.26106 -335.76698 -485.92231 -433.99179
Pseudo R2 17.65 7.65 11.42 9.09
Wald χ2 110.23 ∗∗∗ 75.18∗∗∗ 113.78∗∗∗ 98.92∗∗∗
Logit model (1=reward-based), robust standard errors in parenthesis. Two-tailed signiﬁcance:
∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01). n = 13,249
101both estimations, I see no evidence that reward-based disclosure increases the likeli-
hood that a vulnerability will be exploited. Based on these results, I ﬁnd no support
for Hypothesis 1 that reward-based mechanisms increase the risk of exploitation or
for the competing Hypothesis 2 that reward-based mechanisms decrease the risk of
exploitation.
Next, I examine how reward-based or non-reward-based disclosure aﬀects the
speed with which a vulnerability is exploited. The logit regressions in Model 3 and
Model 4 (Table 22) indicate that disclosure through a reward-based mechanism does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited within one
month of disclosure. However, Model 5 and Model 6 do indicate that reward-based
disclosure decreases the likelihood of exploitation during the week after publication.
(Similar models using time periods shorter than one week show similar results, but
lack statistical power primarily due to the reduced number of exploitations in gen-
eral as the time period shrinks.) This is important because decreasing the likelihood
of exploitation in the short term allows for IT infrastructure professionals to imple-
ment countermeasures such as patching. Based on these results, I ﬁnd support for
Hypothesis 3 that reward-based disclosure decreases the risk of exploitation shortly
after disclosure.
Finally, I examine the volume of alerts generated by a vulnerability. The panel
regression in Table 24 is based on 139,347 daily observations of each vulnerability
for 960 clients locations. Model 1 shows that the volume of alerts increases as the
age increases. Model 2 ﬁnds no evidence that the availability of a patch reduces
the volume of alerts. Model 3 ﬁnds that the availability of a signature increases
the volume of alerts. Finally, Model 4 and Model 5 show that disclosure through a
reward-based mechanism signiﬁcantly reduces the volume of alerts seen. Based on
these results, I ﬁnd support for Hypothesis 4 that reward-based disclosure decreases
the volume of alerts from a vulnerability.
102Table 22: Choice of Exploitation of Vulnerabilities
Within Sample Within One Month Within One Week
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -2.3932∗∗∗
(0.3871)
-2.3716∗∗∗
(0.3842)
-4.1762∗∗∗
(0.6517)
-4.1280∗∗∗
(0.6466)
-3.2629∗∗∗
(0.7053)
-3.1895
(0.7018)
Complexity:
Medium
-0.9509∗∗∗
(0.2368)
-0.9468∗∗∗
(0.2366)
-0.7935∗∗
(0.3248)
-0.7877∗∗
(0.3261)
-1.1818∗∗∗
(0.4789)
-1.2041∗∗∗
(0.4837)
Complexity: High 0.1557
(0.2614)
0.1494
(0.2620)
0.3835
(0.3233)
0.3735
(0.3236)
0.5078
(0.4342)
0.4738
(0.4367)
Conﬁdence Impact 0.3541
(0.3048)
0.3566
(0.3048)
0.2254
(0.5327)
0.23821
(0.5342)
-1.5491∗∗
(0.6785)
-1.5984∗∗
(0.7135)
Integrity Impact 0.9716∗∗∗
(0.3238)
0.9706∗∗∗
(0.3227)
1.4507∗∗
(0.6129)
1.4515∗∗
(0.6115)
— —
Availability Impact -0.2330
(0.2605)
-0.2287
(0.2590)
0.2674
(0.4763)
0.2682
(0.4723)
1.3606∗
(0.7424)
1.4296∗
(0.7740)
Vuln: Access -0.8830
(0.7604)
-0.8600
(0.76128)
-0.7107
(1.0447)
-0.6484
(1.0470)
0.3110
(1.1211)
0.4770
(1.1406)
Vuln: Input Valida-
tion
0.4081∗∗
(0.2069)
0.3894∗
(0.2054)
0.3344
(0.2664)
0.2913
(0.2632)
0.9179∗∗∗
(0.3551)
0.8800∗∗∗
(0.3555)
Vuln: Design -0.0996
(0.2946)
-0.1259
(0.2943)
0.2170
(0.3773)
0.1520
(0.3769)
0.1777
(0.5332)
0.0723
(0.5299)
Vuln: Exception -0.1688
(0.3856)
-0.1923
(0.3848)
-0.7212
(0.6391)
-0.7923
(0.6402)
-0.4856
(0.8335)
-0.6495
(0.8475)
Vuln: Conﬁg 0.5444
(0.6993)
0.5410
(0.7073)
-0.0297
(1.0526)
-0.0460
(1.0555)
— —
Vuln: Race -0.3283
(0.9724)
-0.3260
(0.9537)
— — — —
Vuln: Other -0.0101
(0.7050)
-0.0512
(0.7058)
0.8282
(0.7301)
0.7252
(0.7308)
0.1974
(1.2151)
0.0002
(1.2061)
Patch Available -0.5976∗∗∗
(0.1871)
-0.5701∗∗∗
(0.1917)
-0.4687∗
(0.2596)
-0.4074
(0.2641)
-0.4770
(0.3706)
-0.3960
(0.3720)
Signature Available 1.1066∗∗∗
(0.2412)
1.1228∗∗∗
(0.2413)
1.2743∗∗∗
(0.2984)
1.3161∗∗∗
(0.3000)
2.1340∗∗∗
(0.3996)
2.2411∗∗∗
(0.4056)
Reward-based Dis-
closure
-0.2598
(0.3089)
-0.6691
(0.4507)
-1.3421∗
(0.7609)
Observations 1055 1055 1047 1047 804 804
Log likelihood -397.2295 -396.8439 -239.6904 -238.4691 -132.3755 -130.2724
Pseudo R2 9.05 9.14 10.36 10.82 15.17 16.52
Wald χ2 70.91∗∗∗ 72.37∗∗∗ 52.28∗∗∗ 54.45∗∗∗ 52.85∗∗∗ 54.37∗∗∗
Logit model (1=exploited), robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01).
103Table 23: Risk of Exploitation of Vulnerabilities
Complete Sample Within One Month Within One Week
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 0 Model 1 Model 0 Model 1
Complexity:
Medium
1.3984
(0.3379)
1.4638
(0.3622)
2.1970∗∗
(0.8030)
2.5432∗∗
(1.0007)
3.1766∗∗∗
(1.4843)
3.8307∗∗∗
(1.9330)
Complexity: High 1.5224∗
(0.3636)
1.5025∗
(0.3616)
2.3322∗∗∗
(0.7704)
2.2943∗∗∗
(0.7626)
3.0749∗∗
(1.4226)
2.8543∗∗
(1.3638)
Conﬁdence Impact 1.2940
(0.3951)
1.3229
(0.4066)
1.1187
(0.6510)
1.1713
(0.6981)
0.9751
(0.4746)
1.0393
(0.4953)
Integrity Impact 2.1233∗∗
(0.6877)
2.0968∗∗
(0.6798)
4.0060∗∗
(2.4923)
3.9278∗∗
(2.4886)
— —
Availability Impact 0.8873
(0.2320)
0.8906
(0.2326)
1.3789
(0.7347)
1.4021
(0.7641)
2.0654
(1.1147)
1.9934
(1.1286)
Vuln: Access 0.3363
(0.2591)
0.3249
(0.2521)
0.4599
(0.5178)
0.4129
(0.4770)
1.1256
(1.3714)
0.8777
(1.1387)
Vuln: Input Valida-
tion
1.2037
(0.2453)
1.1858
(0.2404)
1.2414
(0.3682)
1.1759
(0.3487)
1.8313
(0.7413)
1.7122
(0.7048)
Vuln: Design 0.9082
(0.2666)
0.8900
(0.2604)
1.2300
(0.4986)
1.1580
(0.4713)
1.1447
(0.7084)
0.9937
(0.6318)
Vuln: Exception 1.1981
(0.4327)
1.1569
(0.4170)
0.8330
(0.5469)
0.7629
(0.5003)
0.8323
(0.7051)
0.7372
(0.6193)
Vuln: Conﬁg 1.3376
(0.7560)
1.3081
(0.7420)
0.7641
(0.9162)
0.7047
(0.8577)
— —
Vuln: Race 0.3786
(0.3808)
0.3695
(0.3750)
— — — —
Vuln: Other 1.0330
(0.9639)
0.9846
(0.9207)
1.9560
(1.9384)
1.7355
(1.7282)
1.9394
(2.5105)
1.5847
(2.0910)
Patch Available 0.4740∗∗∗
(0.0924)
0.4800∗∗∗
(0.0939)
0.4855
(0.1460)
0.4846∗∗
(0.1483)
0.6048
(0.2732)
0.6013
(0.2816)
Signature Available 2.3354∗∗∗
(0.5133)
2.3783∗∗∗
(0.5254)
3.0832∗∗
(0.953)
3.1719∗∗∗
(1.0081)
5.2960∗∗∗
(2.0603)
5.6997∗∗∗
(2.3434)
Reward-based Dis-
closure
0.7259
(0.2133)
0.4513∗
(0.2174)
0.2662∗
(0.2061)
Failures 153 153 74 74 39 39
Log likelihood -859.405 -858.665 -380.595 -378.633 -189.239 -186.9790
Wald χ2 49.86∗∗∗ 50.86∗∗∗ 2643.01∗∗∗ 2192.94∗∗∗ 6984.87∗∗∗ 5729.36∗∗∗
Cox proportional hazard model, robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05); ∗∗∗(p < 0.01). Observations = 1252.
104Table 24: Volume of Alerts based on Reward-based or Non-Reward-based Disclosure
Variable Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant -0.4666∗
(0.2830)
-0.4980
(0.2805)
-0.4699
(0.3186)
-0.4784∗
(0.2816)
-0.4870∗
(0.2821)
-0.5252∗
(0.3163)
Access: Network 0.4205
(0.2608)
0.4120
(0.2580)
0.4223
(0.2652)
0.4606∗
(0.2591)
0.4636∗
(0.2606)
0.4933∗
(0.2619)
Complexity:
Medium
-0.1359
(0.1229)
-0.0918
(0.1232)
-0.1358
(0.1230)
-0.1604
(0.1227)
-0.1017
(0.1220)
-0.0809
(0.1218)
Complexity: High 0.3640∗
(0.2155)
0.3559∗
(0.2156)
0.3638∗
(0.2157)
0.2801
(0.2174)
0.3523∗
(0.2153)
0.2614
(0.2173)
Authentication -0.4927∗∗∗
(0.0780)
-0.4908∗∗∗
(0.0788)
-0.4929∗∗∗
(0.0780)
-0.4461∗∗∗
(0.0775)
-0.4827∗∗
(0.0772)
-0.4337∗∗∗
(0.0776)
Conﬁdence Impact 0.0560
(0.1912)
0.0505
(0.1911)
0.0560
(0.1914)
0.0156
(0.1905)
0.0608
(0.1907)
0.0157
(0.1896)
Integrity Impact 0.0568
(0.1929)
0.0454
(0.1926)
0.0561
(0.1894)
0.0542
(0.1921)
0.0896
(0.1938)
0.0779
(0.1891)
Availability Impact 0.0186
(0.1735)
0.0222
(0.1734)
0.0189
(0.1744)
-0.0226
(0.1744)
0.0211
(0.1730)
-0.0162
(0.1749)
Vuln: Access 0.0188
(0.1764)
0.0252
(0.1763)
0.0184
(0.1750)
0.0718
(0.1756)
0.0366
(0.1759)
0.0964
(0.1732)
Vuln: Input Valida-
tion
0.1068
(0.1375)
0.0975
(0.1376)
0.1071
(0.1394)
0.1105
(0.1367)
0.0651
(0.1382)
0.0577
(0.1389)
Vuln: Design -0.0406
(0.1691)
-0.0347
(0.1694)
-0.0402
(0.1703)
-0.0781
(0.1693)
-0.0647
(0.1690)
-0.0972
(0.1704)
Vuln: Exception -0.0288
(0.2933)
-0.0154
(0.2931)
-0.0296
(0.2948)
-0.1314
(0.2920)
-0.0180
(0.2931)
-0.1040
(0.2919)
Vuln: Conﬁg -0.2393
(0.3600)
-0.2601
(0.3599)
-0.2380
(0.3633)
-0.1843
(0.3588)
-0.2412
(0.3591)
-0.2098
(0.3604)
Vuln: Race 0.2657
(1.2573)
0.2084
(1.2597)
0.2659
(1.2586)
-0.0669
(1.2710)
0.1940
(1.2552)
-0.1933
(1.2732)
Vuln: Other -0.3946
(1.1531)
-0.3618
(1.1646)
-0.3927
(01.156)
-0.7191
(1.1582)
-0.4516
(1.1502)
-0.7435
(1.1696)
Age (ln) 0.0421∗∗∗
(0.0055)
0.0419∗∗∗
(0.0055)
Patch Available 0.0033
(0.1181)
-0.0053
(0.1206)
Signature Available 0.4224∗∗
(0.2081)
0.4160∗∗
(0.2100)
Reward-based Dis-
closure
-0.3179∗∗∗
(0.1199)
-0.3287∗∗∗
(0.1246)
Fixed Eﬀects month month month month month month
Within R2 1.22 1.26 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.26
Between R2 2.95 3.44 2.95 4.56 3.90 5.90
Overall R2 2.77 3.00 2.78 3.11 3.28 3.83
Wald χ2 1680.39∗∗∗ 1708.44∗∗∗ 1686.00∗∗∗ 1689.74∗∗∗ 1680.74∗∗∗ 1725.99∗∗∗
Panel regression; dependent variable = log of the number of alerts; n = 139,347; 343 vulnerabilities
robust standard errors in parenthesis. Two-tailed signiﬁcance: ∗(p < 0.10); ∗∗(p < 0.05);
∗∗∗(p < 0.01).
1054.7 Summary and Conclusions
Overall, the theoretical impact of reward-based-based mechanisms for disclosure are
not clear. While rewards increase incentives for security research, they may have a
negative impact due to the likelihood of information leakage from the private info-
mediaries (Kannan and Telang, 2005). Based on a large scale empirical study of real
alerts from intrusion detection systems across 960 clients for two years, I ﬁnd evidence
of eﬀectiveness of reward-based mechanisms.
First, while reward-based disclosure does not increase or decrease the likelihood
that a vulnerability will be exploited, it does decrease the likelihood of exploitation
during the one week period after disclosure. This decrease is important for practition-
ers in that it allows more time to implement countermeasures. Further, it indicates
that while leakage may happen, there are potentially positive aspects of leakage.
Second, reward-based disclosure does reduce the volume of alerts. Because of the
overwhelming number of alerts, mechanisms which reduce the volume of alerts can
help administrators better allocate resources.
In general, while information leakage may be occurring, the loss in welfare may
be oﬀset not only by incentive gains but also by positive aspects of leakage as oth-
ers in the security community are made aware of vulnerabilities. This aspect points
to opportunities for research to model and to quantify both the beneﬁts and costs
of information leakage. Future research could also help quantify the impact of spe-
ciﬁc incentive levels in increasing the vulnerabilities discovered. Research would also
be valuable that helped understand if reward-based mechanisms are truly providing
incentives or are just compensating those would be researching and disclosing anyway.
A key insight from this study is that private infomediaries incorporate two distinct
aspects of vulnerability management. First, private infomediaries are able to provide
rewards to encourage researchers. Second, the private nature of the infomediaries
and their subscription mechanisms restrict access to information. While the rewards
106oﬀered may be encouraging research and discovery, the underlying eﬀectiveness of
these vulnerabilities markets may be due more to the restricted access to vulnerability
information rather than the incentives provided.
Finally, the evidence of eﬀectiveness is encouraging for both policy makers and
the security community. Rewards can be eﬀective. Mechanisms that combine the
incentive structures and positive aspects of information sharing while restricting the
negative consequences of leakage could positively impact social welfare. It is towards
these mechanism designs that my research provides encouragement.
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